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The present study manipulated mugshot search task instructions to reveal when witnesses 
make commitment or familiarity based lineup errors.  Additionally we examined the 
memory and decision making processes underlying these lineup choices using a 
computational model.  In order to examine these processes, an extension of Clark’s 
(2003) WITNESS model was developed – WITNESS-ME (ME for Mugshot Exposure).  
In support of previous research, we found a robust commitment effect.  Commitment is 
due to strong encoding of the committed foil and the differentiation of that choice to the 
other lineup members.  When participants were required to choose several foils that 
resembled the perpetrator from the mugbook (rather than searching for a single 
perpetrator), no differences in correct identification between the mugbook and no-
mugbook control were found.  We also found evidence for errors to due to conscious 
inference and source monitoring in all mugbook conditions.  Modeling these data 
supported the hypothesis that witnesses are influenced by the number of plausible choices 
in the lineup and subsequently may adopt different strategies because of this.  Theoretical 







Most theorizing about recognition memory assumes the simplest of decision 
mechanisms borrowed from signal detection: the generation of a scalar familiarity value 
and its comparison to a criterion (for a review of global matching models see Clark & 
Gronlund, 1996).  Even more complex single-process memory (REM, Shiffrin & 
Steyvers, 1997) and dual process (e.g., Yonelinas 1999) theories include relatively simply 
decision mechanisms and fail to consider strategic factors (but see Malmberg, 2008). The 
simplicity of the experiments that are conducted to test these theories limit the strategies 
that individuals deploy.  However, consideration of the use of memory to solve more 
complex problems, like those involving eyewitness identification or studying for a final 
exam, makes obvious that there is more to consider.  For example, a decision criterion 
might vary during testing (e.g., Benjamin & Bawa, 2006; Brown, Steyvers, & Hemmer, 
2007).  Cognitive control can constrain retrieval so only sought after information is 
brought to mind (e.g., Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, & Rhodes, 2005).  Benjamin (2008) 
reviewed evidence involving strategic influences at encoding, the strategic regulation of 
memory access, and the influence of postaccess decision processes.  This memory as 
skilled cognition approach (see Benjamin & Ross, 2008) requires the joint consideration 
of memory and decision processes, an approach we take in our exploration of the domain 
of eyewitness identification. 
Eyewitness identification is an ideal test bed for investigating the interaction of 
memory and decision processes.  There are many different factors at work that affect the 




Olson, 2003). The present research focuses on retrieval and the factors that affect a lineup 
decision.  The simple addition of allowing a participant the option of whether or not to 
choose from a lineup introduces flexibility regarding how a participant can deploy 
memory and decision processes.  But various other factors also play a role, like the 
willingness to make a choice and the decision rules used.  
Clark (2003) developed a computational model of lineup decision making in 
eyewitness identification, a model we will utilize in this paper.  Goodsell, Gronlund and 
Carlson (2010) used Clark’s WITNESS model to explore the effects of how the type of 
lineup (simultaneous or sequential) affects performance.  They proposed decision and 
memory modifications to WITNESS that involved the shifting of the decision criterion 
and the improvement of a memory probe.  The current study is conducted in the same 
spirit, with the focus on the effects of mugshot exposure on lineup identification 
accuracy.   
Two real world cases set the backdrop for the current project.  First, Ronald 
Cotton was convicted of rape and burglary and sentenced to life plus 54 years.  The 
victim, Jennifer Thompson, was robbed and sexually assaulted. A few days after the 
crime, the police had Thompson view mugshots of individuals with a criminal record. 
She chose Ronald Cotton from the mugbook search. Cotton was arrested and later 
appeared in a lineup where Thompson again chose him.  Cotton spent over 10 years in 
prison before being exonerated by DNA evidence. Interestingly, Thompson had an 
opportunity to see her actual assailant in a retrial after claims that Bobby Poole (the 
actual perpetrator) had confessed to the crime while in prison.  Poole was brought before 




 The second case involved Anthony Woods who was convicted of rape, felonious 
restraint, and armed criminal action and sentenced to 25 years in prison.  The victim, a 
15-year old girl, was assaulted as she was walking to school.  Following the assault, the 
police showed the victim hundreds of mugshots.  Woods was among the photographs 
shown but was not selected. Later that day the victim saw Woods walking by her home 
and she identified him as the man who raped her.  Woods spent 18 years in prison before 
being paroled, after which he sought legal assistance to prove his innocence.  DNA 
testing excluded him as the perpetrator. 
 From these stories it is evident that a simple procedure designed to facilitate a 
police investigation (a mugshot search) can have dire consequences, not only for an 
innocent suspect but also for memory itself.  The current study was designed to create 
situations in the lab similar to those of the Cotton and Woods cases.  Participants view a 
mock crime, search through mugshot photos, and subsequently make a lineup 
identification.  We are interested in the situation where people select someone from a 
mugshot search (like the Cotton case) and when they are exposed to someone in the 
mugshot search that they later see in the lineup (as in the Woods case).  
 The organization of the paper is as follows:  We begin with a review of existing 
research on the mugshot exposure effect.  This review will highlight two potential causes 
of lineup identification error – familiarity errors and commitment errors.  The empirical 
goals of the paper are to explore the factors that give rise to these errors. The experiment 
we conducted investigated the extent to which differing task goals impact these errors.  





 Police routinely employ mugshots in criminal cases involving eyewitnesses.  Prior 
research has demonstrated the deleterious effects of such a practice. A recent meta-
analysis (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006) illustrated two key aspects regarding 
mugshot exposure.  Specifically, eyewitnesses can mistakenly identify someone they 
viewed (but did not select) in a mugshot search in a subsequent lineup (known as a 
transference or familiarity effect) or they can identify someone from a lineup that they 
previously identified in a mugshot search (known as a commitment effect).  Note that the 
case of Anthony Woods would be classified as a familiarity error and Ronald Cotton’s 
case would be classified as a commitment error.  We begin with familiarity errors. 
Familiarity Errors 
 Familiarity effects have been demonstrated most commonly in studies involving 
bystander misidentification (Loftus, 1976; Read, Tollestrup, Hammersley, McFadzen & 
Christensen, 1990; Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 1994).  In studies like these, 
participants are exposed to a perpetrator in one context and an innocent bystander in 
another context, who they subsequently mistakenly identify in an identification task.  
Mistaken identification has been attributed to one of three processes in this situation (see 
Phillips, Geiselman, Haghighi, & Lin, 1997).  In unconscious transference (Loftus, 
1976), an eyewitness misidentifies the bystander as the perpetrator because the 
eyewitness only remembers the perpetrator’s context, forgetting the different context that 
included the bystander.  In conscious inference (Read et al., 1990), participants can recall 
both the bystander and the perpetrator being present in both contexts, but infer they were 




when the eyewitness recalls both the perpetrator and the bystander but incorrectly 
attributes the role of the perpetrator to the bystander. 
 Phillips et al. (1997) investigated the boundary conditions surrounding these three 
processes.  In their study, participants watched a video where a bystander and the 
perpetrator were viewed simultaneously within a scene (thus allowing a participant to 
realize that they were two different people) or in separate scenes (where the two could 
conceivably be confused).  Phillips et al. found that in cases where the two had been 
viewed in different scenes, participants were able to identify correctly the perpetrator (P 
=.52) from a lineup that did not contain the bystander, but when the bystander was 
included in the perpetrator present lineup, the bystander was identified at a high rate (P = 
.72).  Written descriptions indicated that participants believed the bystander to be the 
perpetrator.  Thus, their results supported the conscious inference hypothesis.  Phillips et 
al. (1997) concluded that witnesses store separate memory traces that are linked by a 
contextual tag and subsequently infer that the two are the same person.  This finding will 
be important in the development of a formal memory model of mugshot exposure 
(discussed below). 
A similar scenario could occur following mugshot exposure.  One of the original 
studies demonstrating transference in a mugshot exposure study was Brown, 
Deffenbacher, and Sturgill (1977).  In this study, participants were exposed to a target 
person passing out exams in their class.  Two to three days later, participants viewed a 
series of 12 mugshots that included a photo of the target.  Finally, after another four to 
five days, participants viewed a lineup that included the target as well as a photo of 




identifications were most likely to be made to the familiar foil as opposed to a never-
before-seen foil.  Because the participants in Brown et al.’s study were exposed to the 
mugshots in a different context, it is possible that participants who falsely identified the 
bystander believed that the original target person and the mugshot photo were the same 
person. Therefore, participants who make a familiarity error following a mugshot search 
can be assumed to have made either a conscious inference or a source monitoring error.  
Unconscious transference is unlikely because it is doubtful that an eyewitness would 
forget being shown photographs by a police officer.   
The current study will attempt to tease apart conscious inference and source 
monitoring by asking participants to make source judgments for each lineup member.  
Specifically, participants will be asked to rate whether each lineup member was familiar 
from the mock crime video, the mugbook, or for some other reason.  If participants who 
make a familiarity error to a familiar foil (a foil that was viewed in but not chosen from 
the mugbook) are making a conscious inference, the rating of the familiar foil should be 
high for the video and the mugbook.  However, if participants are making a source 
monitoring error, the rating of the familiar foil should be high for the video only.  
Participants also could make a source monitoring error by indicating that the perpetrator 
was present in the mugbook. 
Commitment Errors 
Witnesses who initially select someone from a mugbook are likely to choose that 
same person again in a subsequent lineup task.  Gorenstein and Ellsworth (1980) first 
showed that participants who choose from an initial search through photographs were 




been demonstrated following exposure to a single showup (Haw, Dickinson, & Meissner, 
2007), a medium number of mugshots (e.g., 50; Goodsell, Neuschatz, & Gronlund, 
2009), a large number of mugshots (e.g., 767; Dysart, Lindsay, Hammond, & Dupuis, 
2001), and even objects present on a recognition test (Schooler, Foster, & Loftus, 1988).   
Memon, Hope, Bartlett, and Bull (2002) showed participants a mock crime video 
and half subsequently viewed a 12-photo mugshot search.  This mugshot search 
contained a photo deemed the critical foil, which subsequently appeared in the 
perpetrator-absent lineup two days later.  Note that because the actual perpetrator is not in 
a perpetrator-absent lineup, the correct response is to reject the lineup.  Results showed 
that those who chose from the mugshot search were more likely to make an error by 
choosing the critical foil from the subsequent perpetrator-absent lineup.  Their critical foil 
is what we refer to as a familiar seen foil.  This illustrates that participants do sometimes 
rely on familiarity when making their lineup decisions.  This design, however, 
confounded commitment and familiarity because the only familiar face in the perpetrator-
absent lineup belonged to the critical foil.  Therefore, he could have been selected either 
because he was familiar or because the witness had committed to that choice.  Indeed, 8 
of the 13 participants who selected the critical foil from the mugshots chose that foil 
again in the lineup.  Memon et al. argued that commitment did not play a major role in 
lineup decisions in their study even though the subset of participants that could make 
such an error did so at a high rate (P = .615). 
Goodsell et al. (2009) designed two studies that unconfounded familiarity and 
commitment.  Participants began by viewing a mock crime.  Half the participants were 




the other half were dismissed.  Participants viewing the mugshots were instructed that the 
perpetrator they saw may or may not be present and to indicate if they saw him among 
the photos.  All participants returned a week later and viewed a perpetrator-present 
lineup.  The lineup was presented simultaneously, which meant that all six photographs 
were visible at the same time.  Lineups were tailored for each participant.  Witnesses who 
chose from the mugshot search saw a lineup that contained the perpetrator, their prior 
mugshot selection, a familiar seen foil (i.e., an unchosen face from the mugshot search), 
and three never-before-seen or new foils.  Witnesses who did not choose from the 
mugshot search (mugshot non-choosers) saw the perpetrator, a familiar seen foil, and four 
new foils.  Witnesses who never viewed the mugshots saw the same lineup as the 
mugshot non-choosers, which to them consisted of five new foils and the perpetrator. 
 Results showed that mugshot choosers showed a robust commitment effect: 65% 
chose the same individual from the lineup that they had chosen a week earlier despite the 
actual perpetrator being present in the lineup.  Interestingly, 75% of the mugshot non-
choosers tended to reject the lineup.  Thus it seemed that witnesses committed to their 
choice or their selection style (i.e., to not choose).  Familiarity effects were rare; only 
three witnesses chose someone from the lineup that they simply had viewed in the 
mugshot search.  Goodsell et al.’s Experiment 1 illustrated the power of the commitment 
effect but did not directly test the Memon et al. (2002) hypothesis.  In Experiment 2, 
mugshot choosers were shown a perpetrator-present lineup that did NOT include their 
prior mugshot choice.  If participants in Goodsell et al.’s Experiment 1 made their lineup 
choice based on familiarity, they should have shifted to either the familiar seen foil or the 




(P = .6) rejected the lineup because their prior choice was not present; they stayed 
committed to their selection. Many fewer responded on the basis of familiarity (P = .16 to 
the familiar seen foil and P = .12 to the perpetrator). 
 There were some differences between these two studies.  First, Memon et al. 
(2002) used only 12 mugshots and witnesses made an identification 48 hr later from a 
perpetrator absent lineup, whereas participants in Goodsell et al. (2009) viewed 50 
mugshots and witnesses made an identification one week later from only perpetrator 
present lineups.  Perhaps fewer photos and a shorter delay made the familiar seen foil 
more memorable in Memon et al.  Thus, when mugshot choosers saw a lineup that did 
not include their prior choice, they assumed they were wrong and chose the familiar seen 
foil.  The current study will use a 48 hr delay but will still utilize a 50-photo mugbook. 
It also could be the fact that participants in Goodsell et al.’s Experiment 2 were 
reluctant to choose from the lineup not because they did not see their mugbook choice but 
because they became confused by the familiarity evoked by both the perpetrator and the 
familiar seen foil.  The current study will address this key difference and will utilize both 
perpetrator present (like Goodsell et al.) and perpetrator absent lineups (like Memon et 
al.) and manipulate whether a mugshot choosers’ prior choice is included in the lineup 
(like Goodsell et al. and the 13 participants in Memon et al. who happened to choose the 
familiar seen foil) or not included (like the majority of Memon et al.’s participants).   
 A second goal of the current study will be to investigate the boundary conditions 
of commitment and familiarity.  Given the detrimental effects of possible transference of 
familiarity and commitment, can a mugshot search ever be effective in aiding police 




Martynuck (1994) demonstrated that mugshots could be a useful tool for a police 
investigation.  They found that witnesses that searched though a large pool of mugshots 
(up to 727) that included the perpetrator, were able to select the perpetrator among a 
group of selected photos using a “might be” criterion. Lindsay et al. (1994) did not, 
however, use a perpetrator absent mugbook or require a formal lineup identification of 
these participants.   
 Thus, the current study will vary task goals to explore whether familiarity or 
commitment errors are due to how a participant approaches the mugbook task.  
Participants in the perpetrator search condition will be asked to search through the 
mugbook looking for the perpetrator (as in Goodsell et al., 2009).  However, participants 
in the look alike condition will be asked to search though the mugbook and select any 
photos that resemble the perpetrator.  Participants must choose at least one photo but no 
upper limit was given. 
 The lineups for the perpetrator search and look alike conditions will include either 
a participant’s choice or not.  Participants in the choice included condition will have their 
mugshot choice placed in the lineup (perpetrator search) or a randomly selected photo 
from the pool of photos the participant chose that resembled the perpetrator (look alike).  
Participants in the choice not included condition will not see any prior choices in the 
lineup.  We predicted that participants in the perpetrator search condition would show 
poor performance on the lineup task due mainly to commitment errors.  We also expected 
the rate of commitment to be higher in perpetrator absent lineups given that there would 
be fewer familiar options (i.e., the perpetrator is missing) to compete for lineup choices.  




type of commitment error by selecting the foil (known as familiar selected) that was 
among the ones previously identified as looking similar to the perpetrator.  We predict 
this will occur at a lower rate than in the perpetrator search condition given that their task 
is not to identify a single individual as the perpetrator.  Selecting one foil in the 
perpetrator search condition should create a strong trace in memory whereas selecting 
several look alike foils should create several weaker (relative to a committed foil) traces.  
The reduced likelihood of a commitment error might protect the correct identification rate 
in the look alike condition. 
Lineup errors due to mugshot exposure are clearly problematic for the criminal 
justice system as a witness may not be able to overcome a prior exposure to an innocent 
individual and correctly identify the perpetrator.  Thus another goal of the current project 
is to investigate alternative methods that might protect the witness’s memory from the 
deleterious effects described above.  In addition to trying to limit commitment and 
familiarity errors through the look alike manipulation, we also sought to explore another 
technique that could protect against the deleterious effects of mugshot exposure and 
perhaps even facilitate performance.   
Mugshot Learning Condition 
Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, and Goodsell (2009) compared sequential and 
simultaneous lineup formats to determine under what circumstances a sequential lineup 
resulted in superior performance.  In a sequential lineup, lineup members are viewed one 
at a time (much like in a mugshot search), and a decision is required for one lineup 
member before the next is presented.  Two types of lineups were created.  The perpetrator 




perpetrator was removed and replaced with an innocent suspect.  Gronlund et al. found 
that a witness was better able to discriminate the guilty from the innocent suspect when 
the suspect (guilty or innocent) was placed late (5th position vs. 2nd position) in the 
sequential lineup.  We proposed that witnesses were learning something as the lineup 
unfolded, perhaps constructing a better memory probe.  For example, upon viewing the 
first lineup member, a witness might determine that the nose looks right but the eyes do 
not or that the shape of the face is wrong.  This would allow a witness to proceed to the 
next photo with a better idea of what they were looking for. 
 The findings of Gronlund et al. (2009) suggest that there are circumstances in 
which viewing intervening faces between study (the crime video) and test (a suspect 
appearing in the lineup) can benefit performance.  Goodsell, Gronlund, and Carlson 
(2010) explored this idea using Clark’s (2003) WITNESS model (discussed in depth 
below) and instantiated the idea that a witness gained more diagnostic information as he 
or she progressed through the sequential lineup.  The idea also has found empirical 
support.  Goodsell, Buttaccio, and Gronlund (2010) had participants evaluate six faces of 
known innocent individuals prior to viewing a lineup.  These faces either matched the 
perpetrator to a high degree (fair faces), moderate degree (medium faces), or very low 
degree (irrelevant faces). A control group evaluated scenes rather than faces. 
Simultaneous lineup decisions were more accurate after having viewed the fair or 
medium faces compared to the irrelevant faces or scenes.  Although exposure to 
intervening faces through a mugshot search usually results in a decrement in lineup 




whether having a different task goal while viewing the same intervening faces can 
improve subsequent lineup identification.  
In sum, this paper has two primary aims: (1) To conduct an experimental study 
involving mugshot search, including an evaluation of modifications that might enhance 
the validity of these procedures; and (2) to use the results of this study, as well as prior 
studies, to develop a formal explanation of eyewitness identification that incorporates the 
impact of mugshot search.  
METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 614 participants were recruited from courses at the University of 
Oklahoma and The University of Alabama in Huntsville.  Participants received either 
course credit or a $15 gift card in exchange for their participation.  All participants were 
treated in accordance with APA ethical guidelines.  
Design 
  This experiment conformed to a 3 (Instruction: perpetrator search vs. look-alike 
vs. mugshot learning) x 2 (perpetrator present vs. perpetrator absent) between-
participants design with the addition of a no-mugshot control group (perpetrator present 
and perpetrator absent).  Participants in the perpetrator search and look alike conditions 
were assigned to either a choice included or choice not included condition.  This resulted 
in a total of 12 cells.  Note that participants in the perpetrator search condition could elect 







 Video.  All participants viewed the same mock crime video utilized in Goodsell et 
al. (2009).  In this video, a 20-year old man with brown hair and no facial hair enters an 
office and begins a conversation with a secretary.  After 10 s the man hands the secretary 
a piece of paper.  She takes the paper and exits the room.  Following this, the perpetrator 
reaches into her purse and steals her wallet.  The perpetrator is in view for 25 s. 
 Mugbook.  A 50-photograph mugbook was created using photographs that 
matched the description of the perpetrator (see Goodsell et al., 2009 for a detailed 
description of the photo selection process).  Photographs were presented in PowerPoint in 
the perpetrator search and look alike conditions.  For the mugshot learning condition, the 
photographs were presented via a zPro (Zoomerang.com, 2007) web survey.  Each photo 
was an 800 x 600 pixel head and shoulder photograph.  Only one photograph appeared 
per slide and each photo was numbered from 1 to 50. Participants viewing the photos in 
PowerPoint were allowed to move back and forth through the photos and could view 
some more than once; participants viewed each photo only once in the mugshot learning 
condition. 
 Lineups.  Lineups were custom made for each participant.  Before describing the 
various lineup constructions, an explanation of the various lineup members is required.  
The guilty suspect was a photo of the perpetrator, which appeared in all perpetrator 
present lineups.   New foils were photos that participants had not seen before (i.e., not in 
the mugbook).  Some photos of individuals from the mugbook also appeared in the 
lineup.  For a choice included condition, this was either the photo selected by the 




chosen photo from the subset of photos chosen by a participant in the look alike task 
(called familiar selected).  Finally, all lineups included an individual who was in the 
mugbook (called familiar seen).  Lineup construction for each condition is summarized in 
Table 1.  
Procedure 
The experiment took place over two sessions separated by 48 hr.  In the first 
session, participants began by reading the informed consent.  Following consent, 
participants viewed the crime video.  After the video, all participants worked on a Sudoku 
puzzle for 5 min.  After 5 min participants in the no-mugshot control condition were 
dismissed and asked to return 48 hr later.  Participants in the remaining conditions (i.e., 
the mugshot exposure conditions) received one of three different instructional 
manipulations.  Those in the perpetrator search condition were asked to search for the 
perpetrator.  They were told: 
You are an eyewitness to the identity of the robber from the video.  The actual 
purpose of the study is to see if you can identify the robber from a series of 
mugshots. You will see photographs that, just like in real police cases, may or 
may not include the robber from the video you just saw. Your task is to identify 
the person that you viewed in the video.  You are free to look at each picture for 
as long as you like, and you may look at them more than once.  If you feel the 
robber is among the photographs, write down which number photo. If you believe 
that the robber is not present among the photographs write ‘not here’. 
 
Participants in the look-alike condition were asked to pick out individuals who resembled 
the perpetrator.  They were told: 
You are an eyewitness to the identity of the robber from the video.  In real 
criminal cases the police may show you photographs to help them search for the 
criminal.  Your task is to look though a series of mugshots that may or may not 
contain the robber from the video and pick out any that look like the robber you 




would know more about what the robber looked like.  You are free to look at each 
picture for as long as you like, and you may look at them more than once.  Write 
down the number of any photograph that looks similar to the criminal you saw in 
the video.  You can write down as many as you like. 
 
Those in the mugshot learning condition were asked to rate each face for its similarity to 
the perpetrator.  This was done to make sure the participants actually looked at each 
photo. Participants were directed to a web survey where they were presented the 
following on the screen: 
You are about to see 50 individuals that were NOT in the video you just saw.  For 
each individual, please rate how similar this person looks to the robber from the 
video.  Do this by assigning a similarity rating from 1, which is not at all similar, 
to 7, which is very similar.  Reviewing each of these individual faces and making 
each of these decisions might help improve your memory for the robber.  You 
will be asked questions about him later. 
 
Below each photo was a 7-point similarity scale (1 = not at all similar to 7 = very 
similar).  The participant was required to make a judgment for each photo by clicking one 
of the seven points using the mouse.   
All participants returned after a 48 hr delay and viewed a lineup that was either 
perpetrator present or perpetrator absent, contained a prior choice or not (perpetrator 
search and look alike only), contained a familiar seen foil (mugshot conditions only), and 
new never-before-seen foils.  
 Confidence assessment.  Following each subject’s lineup identification, they were 
asked to indicate how confident they were in their decision on a 1 (not at all confident) to 
7 (very confident) Likert scale. 
 Source judgments.  After making a lineup decision and indicating their 
confidence, participants were asked to make three separate judgments (or two, if in the 




For each lineup member you will be asked how familiar that person is to you. You 
will rate each of the six persons on a 1 to 7 scale. You must decide if each lineup 
member seems familiar because he: 
(1) was in the video and/or 
(2) was among the mugshots you looked at in session 1 and/or 
(3) seems familiar for some other reason (e.g., they look like someone you 
know, or you can’t explain why they are familiar - they just are).  
 
RESULTS 
 Goodsell et al., (2009) reported 73% choosing from the mugbook. The current 
experimental protocol, which was very similar, also resulted in a high choosing rate from 
the mugbook (85%).  Because of the rarity of mugshot non-chooser data, we present that 
data in Appendix A and do not consider if further.  Therefore, for all subsequent analyses, 
we excluded data from participants that did not choose from the mugbook in the 
perpetrator search condition. 
 The analyses are organized as followed: (1) decisions from perpetrator present 
lineups, (2) decisions from perpetrator absent lineups, (3) overall effects that jointly 
consider perpetrator present and absent lineups, (4) effects of mugshot exposure, (5) 
confidence and (6) source data.   
Perpetrator present lineups 
What affect did the four instruction conditions (control, perpetrator search, look 
alike, mugshot learning) have on participants’ abilities to correctly identify the 
perpetrator from perpetrator present lineups (see Table 2)?  A 4 (instruction conditions) x 
2 (correct identification vs. other identification) hierarchical log-linear (HILOG) analysis 
was conducted; effect size measures are presented as Cramer’s phi (φc ).  The HILOG 




Follow-up chi-square tests were performed and two significant effects emerged.  A 
significantly greater number of participants in the no-mugshot control condition 
compared to the perpetrator search condition were able to correctly identify the 
perpetrator, χ2(1) = 4.100, p < .05, φc = .169.  Also, a significantly greater number of 
participants in the look alike condition compared to the perpetrator search condition were 
able to correctly identify the perpetrator, χ2(1) = 6.787, p < .05, φc = .196.  In other 
words, making a single selection from the mugbook in the perpetrator search harmed 
performance but making many selections in the look alike condition did not.  The 
mugshot learning condition did not differ from any of the other three conditions.  
Perpetrator absent lineups 
The lineup rejection rate also yielded marginal differences among instruction 
conditions, χ2(2) = 7.336, p =.062, φc = .159.  The control condition had the lowest lineup 
rejection rate (greatest choosing).  Follow-up chi square tests indicated that both the 
perpetrator search (χ2(2) = 4.746, p < .05, φc = .177) and the mugshot learning (χ2(2) = 
6.301, p < .05, φc = .243) conditions resulted in more correct rejections than the control 
condition.  Participants in the look alike condition tended to reject the lineup more often 
than the control condition, however this difference was not significantly different, χ2(2) = 
3.182, p = .074, φc = .141.  This replicates prior work showing that mugshot exposure 
leads to more conservative lineup choosing (McAllister et al., in press).  A detailed 
discussion of identifications from perpetrator absent lineups is included below under the 







For all lineups, we were interested if any of the four instruction conditions 
affected participants’ abilities to make a correct decision.  A correct decision includes 
selecting the guilty suspect from perpetrator present lineups and rejecting perpetrator 
absent lineups.  The HILOG revealed no significant effect of instruction, χ2(2) = 3.865, p 
= ns, φc = .081.  Although there were significantly more correct identifications in the 
control and look alike conditions compared to the perpetrator search condition, the 
greater choosing from perpetrator absent lineups led to the null result for overall 
performance.  Given the ineffectiveness of the mugshot learning condition, we dropped it 
from subsequent analyses.  Additional research will be necessary to understand why the 
current results failed to replicate Goodsell, Buttaccio, and Gronlund (2010); a topic we 
take up in the General Discussion. We turn next to the types of lineups errors that 
occurred following either the perpetrator search or look alike instruction. 
Deleterious effects of mugshot exposure 
 Perpetrator search. Goodsell et al. (2009, Experiment 1) showed that mugbook 
choosers would select their prior choice in a perpetrator present lineup.  As can be seen in 
Table 2, for the choice included condition, the committed foil error (labeled commit in 
the table) represented the majority of all lineup decisions compared to all other decisions 
combined, both in perpetrator present lineups (P = .69, Z = 3.30, p < .05) and even more 
so in perpetrator absent lineups (P = .81, Z = 5.22, p < .05).   
Memon et al. (2002) showed that mugshot choosers shown a lineup that did not 
contain their choice would shift their choices to a familiar seen foil while Goodsell et al. 




condition, the most frequent error in the perpetrator present lineups was a lineup rejection 
(P =.40).  This error occurred more often than choosing either the perpetrator (P = .18, Z 
= 2.41, p < .05) or a new foil (P = .15, Z = 2.68, p < .05) but was not significantly 
different from choosing a familiar seen foil (P = .28, Z = 1.40, p = ns).  In the perpetrator 
absent lineups, the majority of lineup errors were made to the familiar seen foil (P = .38), 
which occurred more often than selecting a new foil (P = .18, Z = 2.11, p < .05).  A 
correct rejection (P = .44) occurred more frequently than selecting a new foil (Z = 2.73, p 
< .05) but less often than the selection of a familiar foil (Z = 0.64, p = ns).  Thus there 
was support for both the Memon et al. (2002) and Goodsell et al. (2009) findings.  
Further consideration of this finding can be found in the Discussion section.  
Look alike.  One goal of the look alike condition was to avoid the negative 
consequences of commitment.  As mentioned above, this procedure resulted in no 
decrement in the correct identification rate compared to the no-mugshot control 
condition.  Apparently, these task instructions created a situation where witnesses were 
less likely to commit to a single choice, but there was an opportunity to make an error 
due to familiarity.  As can be seen in Table 2, for the choice included perpetrator present 
condition, the familiar selected foil received the greatest number of identifications (P = 
.36).  This occurred significantly more often than an incorrect rejection (P = .09, Z = 
3.22, p < .05), a familiar seen foil (P = .13, Z = 2.64, p < .05), and a new foil selection (P 
= .15, Z = 2.36, p < .05).  There were no differences between a familiar selected foil and 
the guilty perpetrator (P = 0.28, Z = .885, p =  ns).  In perpetrator absent lineups, the 
familiar selected foil received the greatest number of identifications (P = .30).  This 




incorrect selection of a familiar seen foil (P = .26, Z = 0.43, p =  ns), and a new foil (P = 
.24, Z =.67, p =  ns).  It seems that even in the look alike condition, some form of 
commitment can occur.  The act of choosing these photos made it likely that one of these 
photos would be chosen again, but not as likely as if they committed to a single choice.  
Confidence measure 
 Following a lineup decision, each participant was asked to rate their confidence in 
that decision on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = not at all confident, 7 = very confident). A 
3 (instruction) x 2 (perpetrator presence) ANOVA was performed on the confidence 
ratings.  Results of the ANOVA indicated a significant instruction by perpetrator 
presence interaction, F (2, 456) = 6.042, p < .05, ηp2 = .015.  Confidence for the no-
mugshot control condition was similar between perpetrator present and absent lineups. 
Although there was a significant interaction for the perpetrator search and look alike 
conditions, it is problematic to interpret given that the data combine whether the choice 
was included (choice included was non-significant) as well as the type of choice made 
(i.e., committed foil, perpetrator, familiar seen, etc.).  A 2 (instruction: perpetrator search 
vs. look alike) x 2 (choice) included ANOVA revealed no effects of the choice included 
variable, F (1, 353) = 1.07, p = ns, ηp2 = .003.  
 Effects of commitment on confidence.  In order to determine if including a 
committed foil in the lineup affected eyewitness confidence, a 3 (Instruction) x 2 
(perpetrator presence) ANOVA was performed.  For the perpetrator search condition, 
only those who made a commit-to-foil error were included in the analysis.  For the look 
alike condition, only those who made a familiar selected error were included.  Results of 




ns, ηp2 = .012), perpetrator presence (F (1, 200) = .725, p = ns, ηp2 = .004), or the 
interaction between the two (F (2, 200) = .215, p = ns, ηp2 = .003).  Goodsell et al. (2009) 
also reported no differences in confidence for those making a commitment error.  
 Effects of familiarity errors on confidence.  No significant difference emerged 
when comparing the confidence of those individuals who selected a familiar seen foil 
compared to others within their own condition, or to the no-mugshot control.  Research 
on confidence and accuracy reveal that confidence is often not a good indicator of 
identification performance (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2007).  Studies that have found a 
confidence-accuracy relationship tend to find it with correct identifications (Brewer & 
Wells, 2006).  Therefore, we conducted a 3 (instruction) x 2 (correct identification vs. 
other identification) ANOVA on the confidence measure for those who chose from the 
lineup.  No significant effects emerged.   
Source judgments 
 Of particular interest for the current research was how participants allocated their 
source judgments following making either a correct identification, commitment error, 
familiarity (seen and selected) error, new foil identification, or a lineup rejection, in the 
perpetrator search and look alike conditions.  As described above, these responses may 
provide insight into the memory mechanisms behind these errors.  For example, if a 
participant rated an incorrect selection of a foil they saw (or chose) in the mugbook as 
likely occurring in both the mugbook and the video, it would be consistent with a 
conscious inference; however, if a participant rated that incorrect selection as highly 
likely to have been present in the video but not the mugbook, it would be consistent with 




type of error the participant made.  These are: a commitment error, identifying the 
familiar selected foil, the familiar seen foil, the perpetrator, or rejecting the lineup.   
 Commitment errors.  In the perpetrator search choice included condition, 70% and 
81% committed to their earlier mugshot choice from the perpetrator present and 
perpetrator absent conditions, respectively.  In both cases this mugshot choice was rated 
as likely to have been in both the mugbook (perpetrator present M = 6.16 and perpetrator 
absent M = 6.49) and the video (M = 4.88 and M = 6.16).  This is consistent with an error 
due to conscious inference.  For these same participants, the perpetrator was rated as no 
different from the familiar seen foil, misattributing the perpetrator’s familiarity more to 
the mugbook (M = 3.00) than the video (M = 1.96).  It seems that this judgment is most 
likely a source error.  
 Familiar selected errors.  Also of interest is how participants in the look alike 
condition evaluated lineup members compared to a familiar selected option.  This 
situation is most similar to those making a commitment error from the perpetrator search 
condition.  Like the perpetrator search commitment errors, the familiar selected foil was 
rated as highly likely to have been in both the mugbook (perpetrator present M = 5.94 and 
perpetrator absent M = 6.00) and the video (M = 5.06 and M = 5.20).  Again, it is evident 
that participants remember their prior look alike selection from the mugbook and endorse 
that they saw him in the video too, suggesting that they are making a conscious inference 
error.  
Familiar seen errors. In both the perpetrator present and perpetrator absent choice 
not included conditions, the familiar seen foil received a high rating for both the 




conscious inference that the familiar foil must have been in the video.  The perpetrator 
was rated as somewhat likely to have appeared in the mugbook, misattributing his 
familiarity to the mugbook (M = 3.55) instead of the video (M = 1.91).  Like those who 
committed in the perpetrator search condition, it seems that this judgment is most likely a 
source error. 
 There were a small number of participants who selected the familiar seen foil in 
the look alike conditions, so these results should be interpreted with caution (see Table 3 
for cell sizes).  For the choice included and not included conditions in the perpetrator 
present and perpetrator absent lineups, the familiar seen foil was rated as highly familiar 
from the mugbook (choice included: M = 4.50 and M = 5.61; choice not included: M = 
4.00 and M = 4.31) and the video (choice included: M = 5.67 and M = 4.31; choice not 
included: M = 4.63 and M = 5.55).  Participants in the choice included condition also 
recognized the familiar selected foil in both perpetrator present and absent lineups (M = 
4.00 and M = 5.62).  Like prior findings, the attributions for the perpetrator seem to be a 
misattribution to the mugbook (choice included: M = 4.67; choice not included M =3.88) 
instead of the video (choice included: M = 1.33; choice not included M = 2.38), 
indicating a source error. 
Correct identifications.  Interestingly, across all conditions, participants who 
identified the perpetrator tended to rate him as familiar from both the mugbook and the 
video (see Table 3). It seems that participants are making a source error by assuming they 
saw the perpetrator in the mugbook. 
No identifications.  In the perpetrator search choice included condition, only six 




because most participants chose their prior mugbook selection.  In the choice not 
included condition, participants from both the perpetrator present and perpetrator absent 
conditions recognized the familiar seen foil from the mugbook (M = 4.81 and M = 3.85) 
more so than from the video (M = 2.18 and M = 1.95).  That means that these participants 
did not confuse the source of that foil.  Participants in both choice included and not 
included conditions did, however, make a source error by confusing the familiarity 
evoked by the perpetrator by attributing him to the mugbook (M = 3.25 and M = 4.38). 
In the look alike choice included condition, there were a small number of 
participants who rejected the lineup, but a fair number in the choice not included 
condition.  As can be seen in Table 3, in perpetrator present and perpetrator absent 
lineups, familiar foils were correctly attributed to the mugbook and not the video.  Again 
the few participants who rejected the lineup in the perpetrator present condition made a 
source error and misattributed the source of the perpetrator to the mugbook (choice 
included: M = 3.25; choice not included: M = 3.89) instead of the video (choice included: 
M = 2.25; choice not included: M = 2.22). 
Overall we found two main findings from the source ratings.  First, participants 
who chose a lineup member who they had previously seen or selected in the mugbook 
rated that choice as highly likely to have occurred in both the mugbook and the video.  
These errors are explained by conscious inference (Ross et al., 1990): participants 
remember both the video and mugbook contexts, but infer that the foil from the mugbook 
was in the video.  Second, when evaluating the perpetrator in the lineup, most 




to the mugbook.  This occurred even for participants who correctly selected him in the 
lineup as well.  
DISCUSSION 
Perpetrator Search Condition 
The results of the experiment reveal the joint effects of commitment and 
familiarity in the perpetrator search conditions and look alike conditions.  A review of 
these effects sets the stage for the computational modeling of these effects.  In the 
perpetrator search condition, we found clear evidence for a commitment effect.  The 
majority of participants who chose from the mugbook selected that same individual in a 
perpetrator present lineup (P = .695).  An even higher proportion committed in the 
perpetrator absent lineups (P = .814, see Table 2).  The perpetrator present condition 
replicates prior work on mugshot commitment (compare top rows of Table 4 illustrating 
that we replicated Goodsell et al., 2009, Exp. 1).  One important goal of the modeling 
exercise will be explain how commitment effects arise.  
How do witnesses respond if their choice is not present?  Recall from the 
discussion above that Memon et al. (2002) concluded that mugbook choosers viewing a 
perpetrator absent lineup were likely to select a familiar seen foil while Goodsell et al. 
(2009, Exp. 2) used perpetrator present lineups and found that participants were likely to 
reject the lineup (see Table 4). Although these two results seem competing, we believe 
that both are correct and reveal differing strategies participants use to make these 
decisions.  For example, some participants commit and between P = .40 (Memon et al.) 
and P = .60 (Goodsell et al.) of these participants stay committed to their choice and 




of the participants do not reject and instead select the familiar seen foil. The fact that 
some participants stay committed while others move to another familiar option might 
indicate the use of differing decision strategies by different individuals.  It also might 
signal a shift from a reliance on recollection to a reliance on familiarity.  We will explore 
these ideas below.  However, to preview, the present study did not always provide 
detailed enough data to demarcate these strategies. Although the modeling exercise will 
reveal some of the underlying mechanisms, it will point to the experiments necessary for 
testing the more detailed hypotheses.  The source data provides a start on the type of data 
we need.  
It was clear from the source data that regardless of whether participants made a 
commitment error or not, participants tended to recognize their prior choice as being 
highly familiar from the mugbook, regardless of their lineup decision (see Table 3).  This 
eliminates the possibility of unconscious transference, because they remember both the 
video and mugbook context.  Participants who did make a commitment error consciously 
infer their choice was in the video.  They also make a source monitoring error by 
indicating the perpetrator was in the mugbook.  The obvious problem with an error like 
this is that a witness who has committed to an incorrect choice may have a difficult time 
providing useful information regarding the perpetrator.  Indeed, Jennifer Thompson (the 
victim who misidentified Ronald Cotton) explained that when Bobby Poole (the real 
perpetrator) was implicated as the culprit she first denied it as a possibility and claimed 
that even after DNA proved Cotton’s innocence, she still saw his face (and not Poole’s) 




In the choice not included condition, some participants allocated their choices 
to other familiar foils (the familiar seen and the perpetrator) and their source data 
indicated that they thought their choice was in both the mugbook and the video. Thus, 
when making a decision, (i.e., where to set a criterion, or how to compare various lineup 
members) the inclusion of these foils would affect how they choose.  This means that 
some participants may be relying on a strategy of familiarity and are simply picking the 
best matching mugbook or lineup member. The participants that rejected when their 
choice was not present indicated that the familiar foils were familiar from the mugbook 
only.  This means other participants may be looking for their prior choice, and although 
they recognize that the familiar seen foil is indeed familiar, do not rely on familiarity 
alone to make their lineup decision. 
Look Alike Condition 
We found evidence that the look alike instruction did not harm a witness’ ability 
to identify the perpetrator from a lineup (compared to the no-mugshot control condition).  
Is that because the look alike instructions mitigated the commitment effect?   There was 
some evidence of this.  Of the 12 participants who selected only one foil in the look alike 
task, only two subsequently chose that individual from the lineup. The decision strategy 
deployed by a participant may depend on the number of familiar choices in the lineup.  In 
the choice included condition, a number of participants chose the familiar selected foil; 
these choosing rates were similar between perpetrator present (P = .362) and perpetrator 
absent lineups (P = .300, see Table 2).  A more puzzling finding was the differing rates at 
which the familiar seen foil was endorsed between perpetrator present (P = .128) and 




chosen the perpetrator (P = .276) allocate their choices to either the familiar seen foil or 
reject the lineup.  In the choice not included perpetrator present condition, most of the 
participants that would have chosen the familiar selected foil (P = .362 in the choice 
included condition) decide to reject the lineup.  Surprisingly, in the perpetrator absent 
condition, many of these choices are allocated to new foils.  This finding, which will be 
difficult for the model to explain, will be discussed below.  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The remainder of this paper is devoted to applying a computational model to the 
data from the current and prior empirical studies.  Clark’s (2003) WITNESS model is the 
first, and to date only, formal, computational model of eyewitness identification.  
Computational models frequently are used in the field of cognitive psychology to explain 
various memory and decision-making phenomena.  The use of computational models 
allows researchers to better specify their theories and has several advantages over verbal 
explanations of phenomena.  These include allowing for a deeper understanding of 
existing data, making constructs and assumptions precise, as well as the generation of 
new and novel predictions (Bjork, 1973; Hintzman, 1991; Lewandowsky, 1993; Shiffrin 
& Nobel, 1997).  
WITNESS assumes that when presented with the lineup, the only information in 
memory consists of a degraded representation of the perpetrator.  No other traces from 
faces or events experienced before or after the crime are included.  However, as we will 
demonstrate, because the perpetrator is the only trace in memory, WITNESS cannot 
account for phenomena where other traces influence performance.  Mugshot exposure is 




matching model, thereby allowing an influence from other traces (see Clark & Gronlund, 
1996, for a review).  To accomplish this, we propose adding additional traces to the 
WITNESS framework to yield a new model, WITNESS-ME (ME for Mugshot Exposure).  
We begin with a description of the original WITNESS model and how it has been applied 
to eyewitness data. 
WITNESS Model  
 In WITNESS, memory for a perpetrator is represented as a vector of features.  
These features are abstract and are not necessarily tied to specific physical features (e.g., 
eye color).  Many memory models make similar assumptions (e.g. MINERVA 2;  
Hintzman, 1988).  First, the model generates a 100-item vector (representing the 
perpetrator) with each feature taking a random value between -1 and 1.  Next, this 
perpetrator is stored in memory.  The quality of the encoding is tied to the parameter c, 
which governs how well a witness’ memory for the perpetrator matches the actual 
perpetrator. The parameter c is a probability specifying whether an individual feature will 
be copied correctly into memory or replaced with a different random value (with 
probability 1-c). 
 The model creates a perpetrator present lineup by placing the guilty suspect (the 
perpetrator) into the lineup along with the foils.  Foils are generated using the parameter 
SFP (Similarity of the Foils to the Perpetrator).  As SFP (also a probability) approaches 
1.0, the degree of match between the foils and the perpetrator increases.  In a perpetrator 
absent lineup, the guilty suspect is replaced with a designated innocent suspect, generated 




In addition to these parameters governing memory, WITNESS includes decision 
machinery to make a lineup identification.  These parameters govern a witness’ 
willingness to make a response and how match values are translated into a decision.  In a 
sequential lineup, the model assumes that a witness computes the match between the 
current lineup member and memory (i.e., the dot product between the vector describing 
the current lineup member and the vector describing the perpetrator).  If that match value 
exceeds the decision criterion (critSEQ), the witness chooses that lineup member; 
otherwise the witness rejects that lineup member and views the next.  
The decision process is more complex for a simultaneous lineup. WITNESS 
assumes that human witnesses consider both an absolute and a relative contribution when 
making a lineup decision (see Wells, 1984 for a discussion).  For the absolute 
contribution, it is hypothesized that a witness compares one lineup member to their 
memory of the perpetrator.  The model computes the relative contribution as the 
difference in match values between the best matching lineup member (BEST) and the 
next-best matching lineup member (NEXT).  These components are weighted by wa and 
wr, respectively (note wa + wr =1). The model chooses the BEST when [wa*BEST + 
wr*(BEST-NEXT)] exceeds critSIM.  In a description-matched lineup (Wells, Rydell, & 
Seelau, 1993) – one in which lineup members are chosen based on their match to a 
witness’s description of the perpetrator – these weights have little effect (see Goodsell, 
Gronlund, & Carlson, 2010).  All lineups dealt with in this paper are description-
matched; therefore, these two weights were set to .5.  
A theoretical explanation of lineup identification is accomplished by adjusting 




hypothetical experiments: Study A employs a mock crime video with a good view of the 
perpetrator, the designated innocent suspect matches the guilty perpetrator poorly, and 
the lineup foils are poor.  Participants were instructed to choose the suspect from the 
lineup. Study B employs a mock crime video that affords a poor view of the perpetrator, 
the designated innocent suspect is highly similar to the guilty perpetrator, and the lineup 
foils are similar to him indicating that the lineup was fair. Participants were instructed 
that the lineup may or may not contain the suspect.  In order to fit the model to these two 
experiments we would use a higher value of c in Study A than B (e.g., .3 vs. .15).  The 
SSP parameter would be low in Study A and high in Study B (e.g., .3 vs. .8) and the SFP 
parameters would be low in Study A and higher in Study B (.25 vs. .5).  The decision 
criterion would be adjusted to reflect the respective choosing rates (lower in Study A than 
Study B).  
 Previous research has shown that WITNESS can account for differences in 
suspect-matched and description-matched designs (Clark, 2003) as well as studies 
comparing simultaneous and sequential lineup procedures (Goodsell, Gronlund, & 
Carlson, 2010).  However, prior applications of the model have operated with only one 
representation in memory—the perpetrator. We believe that one consequence of 
conducting a mugbook search is that we need to consider a model that has more than just 
the perpetrator in memory.  The theoretical exploration that follows is organized as 
followed:  First, evidence will be presented showing that WITNESS lacks sufficient 
machinery to account for the mugshot exposure effect.  Next, an extension of WITNESS 




the Memon et al. (2002) and Goodsell et al. (2009) data. Following this, we turn our 
modeling efforts to the look alike condition.  
Mugshot Exposure with WITNESS 
 Goodsell et al. (2009) found that mugshot choosers selected their prior mugshot 
choice at a high rate (65%) in a lineup that contained the actual perpetrator, a familiar 
seen foil, and three new foils.  Modeling data like these presents a challenge to the 
WITNESS model.  Two additional types of foils need to be considered in the perpetrator 
search condition.  One results when the witness makes a choice from the mugbook.  We 
refer to this as the committed foil and the similarity of the committed foil to the 
perpetrator is governed by SCF (denoting the Similarity of the Committed Foil to the 
perpetrator).  The committed foil must resemble the perpetrator to a high degree given 
that a witness would select this individual from the mugbook as the perpetrator.  The 
other type of foil is termed the familiar seen foil. This is an individual that was in the 
mugbook but was not chosen.  Therefore, this individual should bear little resemblance to 
the perpetrator.  Moreover, the selection of this individual from the lineup signals a 
reliance on familiarity from prior exposure more so than similarity to the perpetrator.
 Model selection was accomplished by finding a parameter set that maximized r2 
as an indication of trend relative magnitude and minimized root mean squared deviation 
(RMSD), which is the square root of the mean of the squared deviation between the 
model and the data (see Schunn & Wallach, 2005).  Parameter adjustments were done 
manually rather than by an automated algorithm.  Consequently, a model that adequately 
fit the data by our criterion was not necessarily the best-fitting model (although it likely 




 The original WITNESS model did a poor job of approximating the data (RMSD = 
.233; r2 = .078).  Specifically, the model selects the committed foil too infrequently and 
the guilty suspect too frequently.  The Goodsell et al. (2009, Exp. 1) data show that the 
committed foil was chosen significantly more than the perpetrator (P = .649 vs. P = 
.095).  Why does the WITNESS model fail to capture this?  Because WITNESS 
maintains only a degraded version of the perpetrator in memory, and because all lineup 
members are degraded versions of the guilty perpetrator, no other lineup member could 
be a better match than the perpetrator. The model chose the perpetrator too often (P = 
.456) and the committed foil not enough (P = .273). 
 A second possibility to bring WITNESS in line with these data involves changing 
what is stored in memory.  Perhaps there is only one thing in memory (of relevance to the 
task), but when a witness makes a mugshot choice, that choice replaces the perpetrator 
trace in memory.  Schooler, Foster, and Loftus (1988) suggested that committing to an 
incorrect alternative impairs memory for the original event, rendering it inaccessible.  
Implementing this idea in WITNESS would involve replacing the original memory vector 
of the perpetrator with that of the committed foil.   
 This idea was implemented by having the model replace the perpetrator trace with 
the mugbook choice for those participants that chose from the mugbook.  We applied this 
model to the perpetrator search condition for both the choice included and choice not 
included conditions from the current study.  The encoding of the mugshot choice was 
governed by a new parameter cmug. This variation of the WITNESS model also failed to 
fit the data (choice included fit: RMSD = .145, r2 = .703).  The model could accurately 




familiar seen foil was not chosen at a sufficiently high rate.  This was especially true 
when the prior choice was not included (choice not included fit: RMSD = .281, r2 = .119). 
 It appears that multiple-exposure extensions to WITNESS are required given the 
difficulty of the fitting either single trace model to the data. We also need to consider 
evidence from Zaragoza and colleagues (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Zaragoza, 
McCloskey, & Jamis, 1987) that participants have access to both suggested information 
and their original memories following misleading post-event information.  The Goodsell 
et al. (2009) data also supported this interpretation: 9.5% of their participants who choose 
from the mugbook were able to accurately select the perpetrator and reject their prior 
mugshot choice.  This might seem like a small percentage but of the 26 participants that 
did not stay committed to their mugshot choice, 7 chose the perpetrator.  Additionally, 
many participants that did not choose the perpetrator still rated him as familiar; the source 
data indicated that he was familiar from the mugbook rather than the video (see Table 3).  
Thus it seems reasonable to assume that memory for the perpetrator still existed 
following mugshot exposure, but committing to someone from the mugbook added a 
strong competitor to memory.  Moreover, given that the familiar seen foil was often 
identified in the lineup, we assumed that a number of the mugbook foils entered memory.   
 The incorporation of multiple traces into WITNESS makes this extension 
(WITNESS with Mugshot Exposure or WITNESS-ME) a global matching model  (see 
Clark & Gronlund, 1996).  We begin with a description of WITNESS-ME and how it can 
be applied to the perpetrator search data and studies that employ this type of design. We 
follow this with a discussion of how the model needs to be modified to address the look 




The WITNESS-ME Model 
 Representational assumptions.  Like WITNESS, WITNESS-ME assumes that 
memory for a perpetrator can be represented as a vector of features.  Subsequent events 
(i.e., mugshot faces) also are represented as separate traces.  WITNESS-ME operates as 
follows: first, a j-element vector (for all simulations presented here, j = 100) representing 
the perpetrator is generated (Perp), with each feature containing a randomly generated 
value between -1 and 1.  A degraded version of Perp is stored in memory (Mem) and is 
tied to the encoding parameter, perpc.  Encoding involves copying each element into 
Mem with a probability, perpc. This parameter replaces c in WITNESS. 
In order to evaluate photos in a mugshot search, as well as photos in a lineup, the 
model needs to specify these.  For a mugbook of size N, foils are generated with the 
parameter SMP (denoting the Similarity between the Mugshots and the Perpetrator), 
which specifies the probability that each feature will match that of the Perp.  As with 
encoding, if a feature is not stored (with probability 1-SMP), it is replaced with a value of 
0.  As SMP increases from 0, the degree of match between the mugbook foils and the 
perpetrator increases.  For a given value of SMP, all mugbook foils would match the 
perpetrator, on average, equally well. However, there would be a lot more variability 
among mugphotos in reality.  A more plausible implementation of a mugbook would 
have SMP be the mean of a normal distribution with variance σ2.  However, this 
additional complexity was not employed here. 
 Lineup foils are generated in the same way as in WITNESS. The parameter SFP 




lineup foils1.  In designs that include a designated innocent suspect, the parameter SSP 
(denotes the Similarity of the innocent Suspect) adjusts for the similarity of the innocent 
suspect to the perpetrator.  However, the current study did not have a designated innocent 
suspect.  
 Now that we have specified the stimuli necessary for a mugshot study, we turn 
our attention to a description of how WITNESS-ME compares foils to memory, how 
additional items are added to memory, and how it makes an identification decision.  










∑ (Fj Memi,j ) / N], 
where Fj is the value of feature j in the lineup member, Memi,j is the value of feature j in 
memory trace i.  The products are summed across the N elements in a vector and divided 
by N.  Then these activations are summed across the M traces in memory to yield Match.  
 Comparing foils and adding items to memory.  After generating the perpetrator 
(Perp), encoding it into memory (Mem), and generating a mugbook, (using SMP), the 
model must evaluate the mugbook and make a(n) decision(s).  Recall that participants 
searched through a mugbook to find the perpetrator (perpetrator search) or to chose a 
subset of mugshots they believed looked similar to the perpetrator (look alike).  We begin 
with the perpetrator search condition.  In this condition, some participants chose and 
some did not.  WITNESS-ME simulates the mugbook search by first computing the 
match value (Match) between each mugbook member and Mem (which at this point 
                                                





contains only the degraded version of Perp).  The model evaluates Match for all 50 
mugbook foils, identifies the highest match value, and compares that value to critmug.  If 
Match is above critmug, then that simulated subject becomes a mugshot chooser and 
WITNESS-ME places that mugbook foil into memory with the encoding parameter comc 
(encoding of the committed foil).  WITNESS-ME also places that foil into the lineup for 
the choice included conditions.  If the best match is less than critmug, then the simulated 
subject becomes a mugshot non-chooser and nothing is added to memory or to the lineup. 
 Based on evidence from studies of suggestion (Zaragoza et al., 1987) and 
transference effects (Phillips et al., 1997), as well as the finding that the familiar seen foil 
was often identified in the lineup (see Table 2), WITNESS-ME assumes that some subset 
of the mugbook foils enter memory in the process of evaluating them.  We assumed this 
occurred in both the perpetrator search and the look alike conditions.  We assumed that 
nine of these mugbook foils enter memory.  Although this assumption is arbitrary, we 
found that varying the number of foils from 5 to 20 did not affect our ability to achieve 
similar model fits by adjusting other parameter values.  These mugbook foils are encoded 
into memory with a probability mugc.  In order to place a familiar seen foil into the 
lineup, WITNESS-ME selects a mugbook foil (that was not chosen, but was placed in 
memory) at random.  We chose to use the random selection method under the assumption 
that the familiar seen foil was not a foil that was chosen (as the perpetrator) and therefore, 
on average was no better than any other mugbook foil.  
Lineup construction.  The final phase of an eyewitness task following a mugshot 
search is the lineup identification.  WITNESS-ME generates a perpetrator present lineup 




a new foil. The remaining lineup foils depends on the particulars of the experiment but 
can be any combination of the committed foil (chosen from the mugbook), the familiar 
seen foil (appears in mugbook and lineup), the familiar selected foil (selected as a look 
alike foil – discussed below), or new (never-before seen) foils.  
In WITNESS, a perfect replica of the perpetrator is placed in the lineup. However, 
in applying WITNESS-ME to the perpetrator search data, we found that this assumption 
did not work. Fitting the data with the perfect replica of the perpetrator resulted in more 
than twice as many identifications of the guilty suspect. Rather, we needed to assume that 
the guilty suspect placed in the lineup was not a perfect replica.  We added the parameter 
DGS to reflect the degree to which the guilty suspect matched the perpetrator.  DGS, like 
the other similarity parameters, is a probability that governs whether each feature of Perp 
will be properly represented in the lineup; features that are not properly represented are 
replaced with a random value between -1 and 1.  Thus as DGS approaches 1.0, the guilty 
suspect more closely resembles how he appeared at the time of the crime. We will discuss 
the implications of this modification below. 
Lineup decisions.  For each lineup member, WITNESS-ME computes Match.  In 
a simultaneous lineup, the model identifies the member yielding the highest match value 
(BEST) and the second highest match value (NEXT).  As with WITNESS (Clark, 2003), 
the model chooses from a lineup when a weighted combination of the absolute and 




mentioned above, these weights have little impact on performance in description-matched 
designs and are held at .52.  The current study utilized only simultaneous lineups. 
The decision criterion for the no mugshot control group was denoted crit. 
However, the decision criterion needed to take different values for the mugshot groups.  
If a common criterion value was used for the mugshot choosers and non-choosers, we 
found that the model performed poorly (e.g., the RMSD value was twice as large for the 
perpetrator search choice not included condition) compared to allowing different values 
for mugshot choosers and mugshot non-choosers. Goodsell et al. (2009) found that these 
two groups choose from lineups at different rates.  Therefore, the decision criterion 
needed to take one of three different values: critmc (denoting the decision criterion for 
Mugshot Choosers), critmnc (denoting the decision criterion for Mugshot Non-Choosers), 
and crit (denoting the Criterion for the no-mugshot control).  
Application of WITNESS-ME to the Perpetrator Search Data 
 To fit WITNESS-ME to the data, we need to consider the design of the study.  
This includes the size of the mugbook and the composition of the lineup.  As mentioned, 
the mugbook utilized in the empirical portion of this study consisted of 50 photos. All 
lineups were 6-person, were either perpetrator present or perpetrator absent, and did or 
did not include the mugshot chooser’s choice in the lineup.  The lineup included a 
familiar seen foil in the mugshot conditions: the model randomly chose a foil that was not 
chosen from the mugbook search. One thousand simulations were conducted for each fit 
of WITNESS-ME to the data. 
                                                
2 To verify that this also was the case with WITNESS-ME, we fit the model to the perpetrator search data 
using a completely absolute rule (wa =1) and using a completely relative rule (wr = 1), and achieved similar 




 We begin by applying WITNESS-ME to the perpetrator search choice included 
data from the current study as well as Goodsell et al. (2009, Exp. 1) and the perpetrator 
search choice not included data from the current study as well as Goodsell et al (2009, 
Exp. 2).  The data include: the choosing rate from the mugbook, correct identifications, 
commit-to-foil identifications (choice included conditions), familiar seen identifications, 
new foil identifications, and lineup rejections.   Overall, the model performed quite well. 
We describe the parameter values required to fit the data followed by a discussion of the 
fit.  
The parameter values for the fit to the culprit search data can be found in Table 6 
(parameter definitions are in Table 5).  We held all the encoding parameters (memc, comc, 
and mugc) constant for the choice included and not included conditions because 
participants could not know which condition they were in.  The value of memc could have 
varied between the current study and Goodsell et al. (2009), but given that we used the 
same crime video and similar materials, it is not surprising that the same value of memc 
worked for both.   
According to WITNESS-ME, what factors are responsible for the commitment 
effect?  A large value of comc was required; making a mugbook choice created a very 
strong trace in memory.  The value of mugc also was large to get the model to choose the 
familiar seen foil at a high enough rate. Notice that the values of comc and mugc were 
smaller for the Goodsell et al. data; this makes sense given that these participants had a 
longer delay between viewing the mugbook and making a lineup decision.  The relative 
ratio of comc to mugc influences the likelihood of making a familiarity error rather than a 




Goodsell et al. data.  Given that our familiar seen foil was one of 50 and Memon et al.’s 
was one of 12, it seems plausible that this ratio would be smaller for the Memon et al. 
data. 
The value of DGS required to fit these data was .7, indicating that accounting for 
the commitment effect required the model to lessen the impact of the perpetrator.  This 
was not required in fitting the look alike condition (discussed below) indicating that 
commitment affects memory for the perpetrator differently than simply being exposed to 
mugbook foils. Perhaps adding the committed foil to memory as a strong competitor for 
the perpetrator functions like the differentiation process proposed by Ratcliff, Clark, and 
Shiffrin (1990; see also Criss, 2006).  That is, the accurate encoding of the committed foil 
makes other foils seem less related by comparison.  In fact, perhaps participants do not 
“find” the perpetrator in the lineup because the committed foil becomes the new standard 
for comparison, and seldom is anything stronger in memory than the committed foil.  
The decision criterion values were set to yield the proper choosing rates from both 
the mugbook and the lineup.  Values of critmug were held constant between choice 
included and not included conditions. 
 Model fit to choice included condition.  Table 7 shows the data and the best fitting 
model results to the choice included conditions for both the current study and the 
Goodsell et al. (2009, Exp. 1).  As can be seen in the top half of Table 7, the fit of the 
model to the data from current study was very good (RMSD = .042, r2 = .98).   Note that 
the mugbook non-chooser data is included even though these cells had a low sample size. 
The model also captures these data.  Although the quantitative model fit is very good, 




between perpetrator present and perpetrator absent whereas the data showed that the 
committed foil was chosen more in the perpetrator absent lineup.  One possible 
explanation is that the number of plausible options in the lineup may affect a participant’s 
willingness to choose.  In the perpetrator present condition there are three lineup 
members that should appear familiar, the perpetrator, a familiar seen foil, and a 
committed foil.  In the perpetrator absent lineup there are only two (no perpetrator). 
Participants were less willing to choose in the perpetrator present condition, perhaps 
because having three plausible options made some participants unwilling to discriminate 
among them.  By separately adjusting critmc to fit the No ID rate of the perpetrator present 
and perpetrator absent lineups, the committed foil rates did differ (P = .676 and P =.777, 
respectively).  Further consideration of the adjustments participants might make based on 
the alternatives they are considering can be found in the General Discussion. 
The bottom half of Table 7 illustrates that the fit of WITNESS-ME to the 
Goodsell et al. (2009) data also was good (RMSD = .057, r2 = .967).  Even though that 
study did not include a perpetrator absent condition, the model predictions (based on the 
parameters that fit the perpetrator present condition) can be seen in the columns to the 
right of the data. Although the overall fit is good, the model does not choose the 
perpetrator often enough. One solution to this misprediction could be if the data include 
some individuals with a very good memory of the perpetrator. These participants would 
not make a mugbook selection from the perpetrator absent mugbook but could still select 
the perpetrator from the lineup.  However, the model is forced to fit the average 
participant, who had a very high criterion because most participants rejected the lineup. 




problem for the data from the current study because the choosing rate was much higher. 
Why was the choosing rate so different between these very similar studies?  The primary 
difference was the effect the retention interval had on the choosing rate of the familiar 
seen foil.  After a 48 hr delay, the familiar seen was the most frequent choice, but the 
familiar seen foil was never chosen after a one week delay.  After a week the familiar 
seen foil is no longer familiar enough and for that reason the criterion is raised. This 
made it difficult for the model to do much of anything besides reject the lineup.  
When we consider what could be happening in this situation we think the problem 
could be that there are three subgroups of witnesses that we are trying to fit with a model 
that assumes that all participants are behaving similarly.  One subgroup might be 
mugbook non-choosers that continue to reject to remain consistent.  A second subgroup 
may have very poor memory for the perpetrator and subsequently cannot find him in the 
mugbook or the lineup.  A third subgroup actually may have a very good memory for the 
perpetrator.  In support of this conjecture, to get the model to choose the perpetrator at the 
appropriate rate, encoding needed to be almost three times as large.  This is consistent 
with a subgroup of participants with a very good memory for the perpetrator who would 
not make a mugbook selection because they did not find him in the mugbook, but due to 
their good encoding of the perpetrator, can still select him from the lineup.  In sum, in 
spite of the good overall fit to the data, the misprediction hints at a greater underlying 
complexity regarding how participants deploy their memory and decision processes.  
Disentangling these three subgroups will require richer data that includes an indicator 





Perpetrator search choice not included. The top half of Table 8 gives the fit to the 
data from the current study (RMSD = .037, r2 = .975); the bottom half of Table 8 shows 
the fit to the Goodsell et al. (2009, Exp. 2) data (RMSD = .025, r2 = .993).  Both were 
very good.  Although the Goodsell et al. experiment included only a mugshot chooser 
perpetrator present condition, the model predictions for the other three conditions can be 
found in the columns to the right of the data.  Recall that the only parameters that were 
free to vary, relative to the choice included conditions, were critmc and critmnc, as 
participants wouldn’t know which condition they were in at the time of encoding.  Even 
with the strong trace of the committed foil in memory, the model captures the pattern of 
data from these two studies using a common set of parameter values, with slightly 
varying choosing rates.  
Overall, the WITNESS-ME model captures the perpetrator search data very well. 
By including a strong trace in memory for the committed foil, weaker traces for familiar 
seen foils, and allowing mugshot choosers and non-choosers to differ in their decision 
criteria, the model accounted for the commitment effect and instances where participants 
reject the lineup because they cannot commit to their prior choice. The one misprediction 
involved the mugshot non-choosers in the Goodsell et al. (2009) data.  Why were the 
non-chooser data from the current study not mispredicted?  First, we should caution that 
the non-chooser data from the current study was based on small sample sizes.  Second, 
perhaps those with poor memories may rely on familiarity and choose the familiar seen at 
high rates after a 48 hr delay but after one week that familiarity is gone and participants 




both cases, but the model cannot for the Goodsell et al. data because of the high criterion 
needed to fit the average.  
Application of WITNESS-ME to the Look Alike Data 
 WITNESS-ME needs a few changes for the look alike data.  Recall that we 
randomly chose a foil from the pool of mugshots selected by the participant and placed 
that choice in the lineup.  To achieve this, the model computed the match values for all 
the mugshots and then randomly chose a foil from among the top six best matching 
mugshots.  We chose this method because look alike participants chose six look alike 
foils on average.  The selected foil was encoded in memory according to comc, which 
should take a smaller value here than in the perpetrator search condition. The critmnc 
parameter was not needed because everyone had to choose in the look alike task.   
 First we show that the look alike condition differs from the perpetrator search 
condition by illustrating how the model performed using the same parameter values 
(except critmc , which was adjusted to match the lineup choosing rate).  For the choice 
included condition, the model over predicted the rate at which the familiar selected was 
picked in both the perpetrator present (P = .715 vs. .362) and the perpetrator absent (P = 
.737 vs. .300) lineup (overall fit: RMSD = .221, r2 = .513). The first modification we tried 
was to assume that making a look alike selection results in a weaker memory than 
making a mugbook selection in the perpetrator search task.  This frees the comc and mugc 
parameters (mugc < comc ).  Unfortunately, this also proved inadequate (RMSD = .078, r2 
= .373).  One problem was that WITNESS-ME was under predicting the correct 
identification rate (model P = .118, data P = .277).   Given the equivalent correct 




we reset the DGS parameter to 1.0, as in the control condition3.  This helped (model P = 
.173) but still did not provide a good overall fit (RMSD =.068, r2= .520).  Although the 
model was mispredicting the lineup choosing rate in the perpetrator present case, simply 
adjusting the decision criterion to fit only these data was not sufficient to bring the 
correct identification rate in line with the data.  Last, we considered that the look alike 
task may have caused our participants to engage in what we had hoped the mugshot 
learning task would have achieved.  Perhaps selecting a subset of foils that looked similar 
to the culprit helped some participants develop a better probe of memory (Goodsell, 
Buttaccio, & Gronlund, 2010).  To see if this idea had merit, we adjusted the value of 
memc to .20.  
 Adjusting memc was sufficient to bring the correct identification rate in line with 
the data; however, we found the same problem we discovered earlier with the differing 
choosing rates between perpetrator present and perpetrator absent lineups. Therefore, we 
allowed different criterion values; the top half of Table 9 presents the fit to the choice 
included data and the bottom half shows the choice not included for the model.  The fit to 
the data was good except for the perpetrator absent choice included data.  Looking at 
these data, we would expect that participants that still wish to choose would allocate their 
choices to the next most familiar foil, which should be the familiar selected foil.  The 
model predicts this to be the case.  However, the data illustrate that participants opt to 
choose the familiar seen foil much more.  Why would they do this? Perhaps knowledge 
of the participants’ opinion of the familiar selected foil would help answer this question.  
In the data, the familiar selected was a random choice of a pool of choices that varied 
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from one to twenty in our study, but the model only picks from among the 6 best.  
Therefore, the familiar selected foil that we randomly chose to put in the lineup was 
worse on average than what was chosen by the model.  For this reason, the model 
selected the familiar selected more often.  This modification helped, but the familiar seen 
still was chosen at a higher rate than the model expected.  Future research will have to 
address why this occurs. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Both an empirical and theoretical exploration of the mugshot exposure effect was 
undertaken.  We conducted a large study exploring the effects of task instruction on 
subsequent lineup decisions.  Additionally, we proposed an extension of Clark’s (2003) 
WITNESS model, WITNESS-ME (ME for mugshot exposure) to aid our understanding 
of these effects.  From our empirical work, we investigated how task instructions affected 
subsequent lineup decision making.  Using an instruction we called perpetrator search, 
we replicated the mugshot commitment effect (Goodsell et al., 2009) – participants who 
view a mugbook with the goal of finding the perpetrator and subsequently choose, are 
likely to select that same individual (given the option) in a lineup.  This occurred at a 
very high rate even when the actual perpetrator was present.  Evidence from participants’ 
source ratings indicated that those making the commitment error consciously infer that 
their mugbook choice was present in the video.  When judging the perpetrator, 
participants misattributed the source of the familiarity evoked by seeing the perpetrator 
and judged him to be familiar from the mugbook and not the video. 
 Evidence from our modeling exploration highlighted two components to the 




that competes with other traces.  For the current study, the encoding of the committed foil 
(comc) was more than four times stronger than the encoding of the perpetrator (memc).  
Second, committing to a mugbook foil decreases the subjective strength of the perpetrator 
in memory as modeled using the DGS parameter.  We suggested that the accurate 
encoding of the committed foil makes other foils seem like poorer matches by 
comparison.  
 WITNESS-ME provided a good fit to perpetrator search data from the current 
study and the data from Goodsell et al. (2009).  However, because the model chose the 
committed foil at about the same rate between perpetrator present and perpetrator absent 
lineups in the choice included condition, we proposed that the number of plausible (i.e., 
familiar) choices in the lineup influences criterion placement.  Thus in the perpetrator 
present lineup, where the perpetrator, committed foil, and familiar seen foil, all match 
memory fairly well, we needed to adjust critmc to be higher than in the perpetrator absent 
condition (where there are only two familiar options).  Benjamin and Bawa (2004) found 
that participants tend to become more conservative on recognition tasks when the number 
of plausible alternatives increased.  Likewise, we found that a greater number of plausible 
lineup options caused participants to be less willing to make a commitment error. 
 When mugbook choosers viewed a lineup that did not contain their prior choice, 
some participants will allocate their choice to a familiar seen foil (Memon et al., 2002) 
while others opt to reject the lineup (Goodsell et al., 2009).  One difference revealed by 
our modeling exercise was that the value of mugc needed to be lower for the Goodsell et 
al. data.  After the one week delay, memory for familiar seen foils apparently were so 




parameter values used to fit the perpetrator search choice included data from the current 
study and lowered mugc from .45 to .15, the model predictions matched the Goodsell et 
al. (Exp. 2).  Another possibility is that the longer delay makes witnesses more 
conservative in their lineup choosing.  By increasing critmc from .134 to .16, the model 
rejects the lineup at the same rate as in the Goodsell et al. study (P = .6) and the familiar 
foil identification rate drops from P = .27 to P = .20.  
Our look alike condition demonstrated no loss in the correct identification rate 
compared to the no-mugshot control condition.  Although this instruction protected the 
correct identification rate, a look alike foil who happened to become a suspect likely 
would be identified in a lineup: The choice included condition resulted in a fairly high 
rate of choices of the familiar selected foil (P = .362 in perpetrator present and P = .300 
in perpetrator absent).  It should be noted that there does seem to be some potential for 
this method.  Lindsey et al. (1994) found that participants were able to include the actual 
perpetrator using a procedure similar to our look alike condition.  We did not include the 
perpetrator, as we were interested in the mechanisms behind lineup errors.  However, had 
we not set up our lineups in a manner that was quite difficult for our participants, we may 
have found even greater support for the use of this method.  That is, it seems unlikely that 
the police would construct a lineup that included so many previously seen individuals.  
The condition with the least amount of familiar foils (perpetrator absent choice not 
included) actually had the highest correct identification rate.  Future research should 
identify if this look alike procedure would be effective for witnesses viewing a lineup that 




 Modeling the look alike condition proved challenging.  Clearly this task involved 
more than evaluating the best matching lineup member to criterion. One weakness of the 
current design is that we had no way of knowing how they evaluated each look alike 
photo, or to what degree any one selection was better than another.  Given that 
participants were told that the perpetrator may or may not be present, it seems plausible 
that some of our participants chose believing that they had found the actual perpetrator 
(committed).  Requiring a confidence estimate for each choice, or simply asking them if 
they believe the perpetrator was present among their choices may identity a subset of 
participants who are approaching the lineup task differently than those who believe they 
picked out innocent people who resembled the perpetrator.  The fact that we constructed 
lineups by randomly choosing a look alike selection means we could have sub-divided 
our participants by whether they believed they had or had not chosen the perpetrator and 
by those who did or did not see that best choice. Although we probably could create 
modifications to WITNESS-ME that fit the pattern of data, it seems premature to do so 
given that we need a better understanding of the processes at hand.  This requires 
collecting more data that answers questions like the ones raised above.   
  Future research is planned to investigate if we can identify individual differences 
as an indicator of one strategy (lineup choosing) over another (lineup rejection).  One 
way to assess this would be to garner a confidence assessment following a selection from 
the mugbook. Those who are highly confident in their choice are the individuals probably 
are most likely to stay committed.  However, those that are less highly confident might 
move to another familiar option in the lineup if their choice is not present or if they fail to 




they selected from the lineup is the same person they picked from the mugbook. That 
would tell us if some participants are making a commitment choice even if they make a 
different selection. Additionally, it would be beneficial to ask participants how they made 
their decisions.  It was evident from the source data that most participants remembered 
that their prior mugbook choice did appear in the mugbook.  Do some of these witnesses 
view the reoccurrence of their prior choice as a confirmation of their original choice?  Do 
they choose to remain consistent, or does choosing from a mugbook create a new 
memory trace that is so much stronger than that of the perpetrator that the only real viable 
choice is the committed foil?  Indeed the low correct identification rate in the current 
study would indicate that memory for the perpetrator was generally weak.  Perhaps 
commitment effects are strongest in these situations.  Using a video that allowed for a 
better encoding of the perpetrator would better test these ideas. 
 To better test the look alike condition we need to know if our participants believe 
any of their choices are the perpetrator.  Participants who believed they had found the 
perpetrator may have adopted a different approach to making a lineup decision (like those 
of the perpetrator search condition) compared to participants who did not.  Furthermore, 
of these participants, only a subset of them may have actually seen the look alike foil they 
believed to be the perpetrator.  Future research should address how witnesses approach 
the task of choosing foils that look like the perpetrator prior to lineup identification. 
 We failed to find evidence of improved lineup performance through our mugshot 
learning task.  Several plausible explanations exist for the differences between the current 
study’s results and those of Goodsell, Buttaccio, and Gronlund (2010).  The Goodsell et 




the perpetrator.  Although our mugshot photos were chosen to be similar to the 
perpetrator (see Goodsell et al., 2009 for a more detailed account), it seems likely not all 
matched the perpetrator to a high degree.  Additionally, there could be an optimal number 
of photos to view beyond which the learning effect yields no benefit and may even start 
to interfere (the Goodsell et al. participants only judged 6 faces).  Finally, it is unclear 
whether engaging in the learning task well in advance of administering the lineup is 
beneficial. The benefits of learning likely disappear by the time a participant made his or 
her lineup identification 48 hrs later.  Goodsell et al.’s participants completed the learning 
task immediately before the lineup identification. Future research will need to investigate 
these possibilities.  
 Finally, our results are consistent with prior research on mugshot exposure and 
suggest that witnesses who are exposed to a mugshot search should not participant in a 
subsequent lineup identification task.  Perhaps developing techniques like the look alike 
task could allow for both procedures (see also Lindsay et al., 1994).  However, until more 
is understood about the memory and decision making processes involved when witnesses 
partake in multiple identification procedures it may be best to recommend law 
enforcement avoid them. 
Brewer, Weber, and Semmler (2007) note that theoretical advances regarding 
eyewitness decision making have been sparse over the past few decades. But the use of 
computational modeling is one tool that can help us redress this inadequacy (Clark, 2008; 
Goodsell, Gronlund, & Carlson, 2010; Wells, 2008). Through the use of the WITNESS-
ME model, we developed a set of explanations for how eyewitnesses approach a lineup 




additional questions that need to be addressed by future research.  Eyewitness 
identification always will be fallible.  However, the greatest potential for improving 
techniques lies in capitalizing upon an increased understanding of the processes that 
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Lineup Composition for Each Condition 
PSCI PSCNI LACI LACNI 
Perpetrator Present 
perpetrator perpetrator perpetrator perpetrator 
mugshot choice familiar seen mugshot choice familiar seen 
familiar seen 4 new foils familiar seen 4 new foils 
3 new foils  3 new foils  
Perpetrator Absent 
mugshot choice familiar seen mugshot choice familiar seen 
familiar seen 5 new foils familiar seen 4 new foils 








Proportion of Lineup Choices by Condition 
   Control PSCI PSCNI LACI LACNI MLN 
Perpetrator Present        
 Perpetrator  .294 .083 .175 .276 .315 .226 
 New Foil  .588 .083 .150 .149 .204 .094 
 Commit  n/a .695 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Familiar Seen  n/a .028 .275 .128 .148 .452 
 Familiar Chosen  n/a n/a n/a .362 n/a n/a 
 No ID  .118 .111 .400 .085 .333 .226 
Perpetrator Absent        
 New Foil  .86 .139 .178 .240 .522 .428 
 Commit  n/a .814 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Familiar Seen  n/a .000 .378 .260 .239 .262 
 Familiar Chosen  n/a n/a n/a .300 n/a n/a 
 No ID  .14 .047 .444 .200 .239 .310 
         





Source Judgments for All Conditions Separated By Type of Lineup Decision 
  Choice Included Choice Not Included 
 CP CA CP CA 
 video mug video mug video mug video mug 
 Perpetrator Search Condition 
Commit  N = 25 N = 35 n/a n/a 
 Commit 4.88 6.16 5.43 6.49     
 Fam seen 1.56 3.48 1.46 4.29     
 Perpetrator 1.96 3.00 n/a n/a     
Fam Seen N = 1 N = 0 N = 11 N = 17 
 Fam Seen 6.00 3.00   5.72 5.82 5.29 5.41 
 Commit 1.00 6.00   n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Perpetrator 3.00 4.00   1.91 3.55 n/a n/a 
Correct ID N = 3 n/a N = 7 n/a 
 Perpetrator 6.00 4.67   5.29 5.71   
 Commit 1.00 7.00   n/a n/a   
 Fam Seen 2.33 4.67   3.71 6.00   
No ID N = 4 N = 2 N = 16 N = 16 
 Perpetrator 1.00 3.25 n/a n/a 1.69 4.38 n/a n/a 
 Commit 2.00 7.00 3.00 6.50 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Fam Seen 1.00 4.75 1.00 5.00 2.19 4.81 1.95 5.82 
  Look Alike Condition 
Fam Selected N = 17 N = 15 n/a n/a 
 Fam Selected 5.06 5.94 5.20 6.00     
 Fam Seen 1.94 3.65 2.2 4.33     
 Perpetrator 2.00 2.65 n/a n/a     
Fam Seen N = 6 N = 13 N = 8 N = 11 
 Fam Seen 5.67 4.5 4.31 5.62 4.63 4.00 5.55 4.64 
 Fam Selected 2.67 5.5 2.15 5.62 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Perpetrator 1.33 4.67 n/a n/a 2.38 3.88 n/a n/a 
Correct ID N = 13 n/a N = 17 n/a 
 Perpetrator 4.83 4.67   4.35 3.88   
 Fam Selected 2.00 2.65   n/a n/a   
 Fam Seen 1.85 5.08   2.24 5.24   
No ID N = 4 N = 10 N = 18 N = 11 
 Perpetrator 2.25 3.25 n/a n/a 2.22 3.89 n/a n/a 
 Fam Selected 1.00 4.00 2.50 5.40 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Fam Seen 1.50 3.50 2.10 3.80 2.33 4.06 1.27 4.64 
          
Note. PP = Perpetrator present, PA = perpetrator absent.  Commit is short for committed 





Proportion of Lineup Choices for Mugbook Choosers 
  Perpetrator Commit Fam Seen New Foil No ID 
  Perpetrator Present 
Choice Included      
 Experiment 1 .083 .695 .028 .083 .111 
 Goodsell et al.  Exp. 1 .095 .649 .041 .080 .135 
Choice Not Included      
 Experiment 1 .175 n/a .275 .150 .400 
 Goodsell et al. Exp. 2 .120 n/a .160 .120 .600 
  Perpetrator Absent 
Choice Included      
 Experiment 1 n/a n/a .378 .178 .444 
 Memon et al. n/a n/a .350 .250 .400 
       






Notation and Model Parameters 
Perp Vector representing the perpetrator 
Mem All Vectors in Memory.  Vectors are degraded versions of a target foil (Perp or 
mugbook foil) 
Match Match value of a particular foil to memory 
 Encoding Parameters 
memc Encoding parameter indicating the probability each element of the perpetrator 
will be stored correctly 
comc Encoding parameter indicating the probably each element of mugshot choice 
will be stored correctly in memory 
mugc Encoding parameter indicating the probably each element of the subset of 
mugshot foils will be stored correctly in memory 
 Similarity Parameters 
SMP Similarity between a given mugbook foil and the perpetrator 
SFP Similarity between the lineup foils and the perpetrator 
DGS Degradation of the guility suspect 
 Decision Criteria 
critmug Criterion for choosing from the mugbook 
critmc Criterion for making an identification from the lineup for mugbook choosers 
critmnc Criterion for making an identification from the lineup for mugbook non-
choosers 







Parameter Values for the Perpetrator Search Data – Choice Included and Choice Not 
Included 
  memc comc mugc SMP SFP DGS critmug critmc critmnc 
Included          
 Current study .13 .60 .45 .10 .25 .70 .062 .125 .110 
 Goodsell et 
al. Exp. 1 
.13 .45 .15 .10 .25 .70 .068 .108 .148 
Not Included          
 Current 
Study 
.13 .60 .45 .10 .25 .70 .062 .134 .110 
 Goodsell et 
al. Exp. 2 





Data, Model Predictions, and Fit Statistics for the Perpetrator Search Choice Included 
Conditions 
  Data Model  Fit 
  PP PA PP PA choose RMSD r2 
Experiment 1 – Choice Included 
Mug Chooser      .042 .980 
 Perpetrator .083 n/a .055 n/a Data   
 Commit .695 .814 .736 .750 .850   
 Fam Seen .028 .140 .096 .113 Model   
 New Foil .083 .000 .032 .051 .851   
 No ID .111 .046 .081 .086    
Mug Non-Chooser        
 Perpetrator .158 n/a .195 n/a    
 Fam Seen .368 .400 .376 .409    
 New Foil .158 .300 .154 .282    
 No ID .316 .300 .275 .309    
Goodsell et al. (2009, Exp. 1) – Choice Included 
Mug Chooser      .057 .967 
 Perpetrator .095  .058 n/a Data   
 Commit .649  .704 .712 .74   
 Fam Seen .041  .050 .054 Model   
 New Foil .080  .055 .105 .764   
 No ID .135  .133 .129    
Mug Non-Chooser        
 Perpetrator .179  .039 n/a    
 Fam Seen .000  .054 .059    
 New Foil .071  .129 .172    
 No ID .750  .773 .770    
 







Data, Model Predictions, and Fit Statistics for the Perpetrator Search Choice Not 
Included Conditions 
  Data Model  Fit 
  CP CA CP CA choose RMSD r2 
Experiment 1 – Choice Not Included 
Mug Chooser      .037 .975 
 Culprit .175 n/a .151 n/a Data   
 Fam Seen .275 .378 .300 .339 .85   
 New Foil .150 .178 .126 .208 Model   
 No ID .400 .444 .423 .453 .874   
Mug Non-Chooser        
 Culprit .158 n/a .143 n/a    
 Fam Seen .368 .400 .413 .437    
 New Foil .158 .300 .166 .222    
 No ID .316 .300 .278 .341    
Goodsell et al. (2009, Exp. 2) – Choice Not Included 
Mug Chooser      .025 .993 
 Culprit .120  .128 n/a Data   
 Fam Seen .160  .082 .091 .740   
 New Foil .120  .178 .264 Model   
 No ID .600  .612 .644 .726   
Mug Non-Chooser        
 Culprit   .062 n/a    
 Fam Seen   .069 .066    
 New Foil   .084 .186    
 No ID   .785 .748    
 







Data, model predictions, and fit statistics for the Look Alike Condition  
 Data Model Fit 
 PP PA PP PA RMSD r2 
 Choice Included 
Perpetrator .277 n/a .261 n/a .067 .646 
Fam Selected .362 .300 .361 .395  
Fam Seen .127 .140 .115 .140   
New Foil .149 .240 .178 .340  
No ID .085 .200 .085 .125   
 Choice Not Included 
Perpetrator .315 n/a .293 n/a .050 .806 
Fam Seen .148 .239 .168 .205  
New Foil .204 .522 .276 .490   
No ID .333 .239 .263 .305  
 
Note.  Parameter values for Choice Included: memc = .18, comc =.20, mugc =.19, critmc = 







Mugbook Non-Chooser Data 
Table Al 
Mugbook Non-Chooser Data 
  Perpetrator Present Perpetrator Absent 
Lineup Member   
 Perpetrator .158 (3) n/a 
 Familiar Seen .368 (7) .300 (3) 
 New Foil .158 (3) .400 (4) 
 No ID .315 (6) .300 (3) 
    










(* WITNES-ME: Perpetrator Search Choice Included *) 
 
encode = .13;             (*Encoding of Perp*) 
dgs = .7;  (*degraded perp*) 
cencode = .6;             (*encoding of Committed foil *) 
mugencode = .45;       (*encoding to mugphotos into memory *) 
cmug = .062;           (*Criterion for choosing from mugbook*) 
smp = .1;  (*Similarity of mugbook foils to Perp*) 
sfp = .25;                     (*Similarity of lineup foils to perp*) 
mugsize = 50;         (*mugbook size*) 
mccsim = .125;          (*lineup decision criterion – mugbook choosers*) 
mnccsim = .11; (*lineup decision criterion – mugbook non-choosers*) 
wa = .5; wr = .5;     (*decision weights*) 
ncore = 2;                 (*numberof cores*) 
nsim = 500;              (* number of simulations per core*) 
tsim = ncore*nsim;   (*number of total simulations*) 
simdata = Table[0, {k, 2}, {i, 2}, {j, 5}]; 
 
(* Goodsell Dissertation data*)  
 
(* Overall Mugshot choosing rate*) mugchoose = .85; 
 
(*MUGBOOK CHOOSER - TP Lineup*) 
(*SUS ID*)        simdata[[1, 1, 1]] = .083; 
(*Commit*)       simdata[[1, 1, 2]] = .695; 
(*FamSeen Foil*)  simdata[[1, 1, 3]] = .028;  
(*New Foil*)    simdata[[1, 1, 4]] = .083; 
(*NO ID*)          simdata[[1, 1, 5]] = .111; 
(*MUGBOOK NON-CHOOSER - TP Lineup*) 
(*SUS ID*)        simdata[[2, 1, 1]] = .158; 
(*FamSeen Foil*)  simdata[[2, 1, 3]] = .368;  
(*New Foil*)    simdata[[2, 1, 4]] = .158; 






(*MUGBOOK CHOOSER - TA Lineup*) 
(*Commit*)         simdata[[1, 2, 2]] = .814; 
(*FamSeen Foil*)  simdata[[1, 2, 3]] = .140; 
(*New Foil*)    simdata[[1, 2, 4]] = .0;    
(*NO ID*)           simdata[[1, 2, 5]] = .046; 
(*MUGBOOK NON-CHOOSER TA Lineup*) 
(*FamSeen Foil*)  simdata[[2, 2, 3]] = .400; 
(*New Foil*)    simdata[[2, 2, 4]] = .300;  
(*No ID*)           simdata[[2, 2, 5]] = .300; 
wme[] := ( 
rand[] := RandomReal[{-1, 1}]; 
ilen = 100;              (*vector length*) 
simresp = Table[0, {k, 2}, {i, 2}, {j, 5}];  
choosers = Table[0.000001, {i, 2}];  
(*k: 1=chooser 2=non-chooser; i: 1=TP 2=TA; j: response options *) 
For[isim = 1, isim <= nsim, isim++, 
 
perp = Table[rand[], {i, ilen}]; (*Creates Perp*) 
mem = Table[0, {i, 10}, {j, ilen}] ; (*Empty 10x100 memory vector*) 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= encode, mem[[1, j]] = perp[[j]], mem[[1, j]] = rand[]], {j, ilen}]; 
(* degraded Perp goes into 1st position in memory*) 
lineup = Table[0, {k, 2}, {i, 6}, {j, ilen}]; (*creates empty 6-person PP and PA lineups*) 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= dgs, lineup[[1, 1, j]] = perp[[j]], lineup[[1, 1, j]] = rand[]]; 
 , {j, ilen}];      (*perp goes into 1st position in TP lineup*) 
 
(*Lineup foils*) 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= sfp, lineup[[1, i, j]] = perp[[j]], lineup[[1, i, j]] = rand[]]; 
, {j, ilen}, {i, 3, 6}];   (* positions 3-6 for PP *) 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= sfp, lineup[[2, 1, j]] = perp[[j]], lineup[[2, 1, j]] = rand[]]; 
 , {j, ilen}]; 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= sfp, lineup[[2, i, j]] = perp[[j]], lineup[[2, i, j]] = rand[]]; 












mugbook = Table[0, {i, mugsize + 1}, {j, ilen}];  
(*generates mugbook + fam seen foil in pos 51*) 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= smp, mugbook[[i, j]] = perp[[j]], mugbook[[i, j]] = rand[]]; 
 , {j, ilen}, {i, mugsize + 1}]; 
 
Do[lineup[[k, 2, j]] = mugbook[[51, j]], {j, ilen}, {k, 2}]; 
(*fam foil goes into 2nd position in BOTH lineups*) 
 
(*Subset of familiar foils into memory*) 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= mugencode, mem[[i, k]] = mugbook[[i, k]], mem[[i, k]] = 
rand[]]; , {k, ilen}, {i, 3, 10}]; 
 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= mugencode, mem[[2, k]] = mugbook[[51, k]], mem[[2, k]] = 
rand[]]; , {k, ilen}];  (*This places the familiar foil into memory*) 
match1 = Table[0, {i, mugsize}]; 
Do[match1[[j]] = (mem[[1, k]] * mugbook[[j, k]]) + match1[[j]], {k, ilen}, {j,mugsize}]; 
Do[match1[[j]] = match1[[j]]/ilen, {j, mugsize}]; 
imax = Drop[Ordering[match1], mugsize - 1]; (*identifies best mugbook member*) 
 
(*Mugshot choosers*) 
If[Max[match1[[imax]]] > cmug , 
lineuptype = 1; 
choosers[[lineuptype]] = choosers[[lineuptype]] + 1; 
Do[If[RandomReal[] <= cencode, mem[[3, k]] = Max[mugbook[[imax[[1]], k]]],  
mem[[3, k]] = rand[]];   (*places mugbook choice in memory*) 
lineup[[1, 3, k]] = Max[mugbook[[imax[[1]], k]]];  (*places mc in PP lineup*) 
lineup[[2, 3, k]] = Max[mugbook[[imax[[1]], k]]];  (*places mc in PA lineup*) 





If[Max[match1[[imax]]] <= cmug,  
lineuptype = 2; 







 (*Lineup match values*) 
Do[Do[match1[[j]] = mem[[i, k]] * lineup[[1, j, k]] + match1[[j]],  
{k, ilen},{i,imemsize}]; , {j, 6}];   (*CP*) 
 
Do[Do[match2[[j]] = mem[[i, k]] * lineup[[2, j, k]] + match2[[j]], {k, ilen}, 
{i, imemsize}]; , {j, 6}];    (*CA*) 
 
Do[match1[[j]] = match1[[j]]/ilen, {j, 6}];  
Do[match2[[j]] = match2[[j]]/ilen, {j, 6}]; 
xmax[[1]] = Drop[Sort[match1], 5]; xmax[[2]] = Drop[Sort[match2], 5];  
(* Best matches *) 
imax[[1]] = Drop[Ordering[match1], 5]; imax[[2]] = Drop[Ordering[match2], 5]; 
(* Position of best match *) 
nbest[[1]] = Take[Sort[match1], {5, 5}]; nbest[[2]] = Take[Sort[match2], {5, 5}]; 
(* Next best match *) 
ev1 = Max[(wa * (xmax[[1]] - nbest[[1]])) + (wr * xmax[[1]])]; 
ev2 = Max[(wa * (xmax[[2]] - nbest[[2]])) + (wr * xmax[[2]])]; 
 
 
(* simresp 1 = Perpetrator; 2 = Committed foil; 3 = Familiar Seen foil; 4 = New Foil; 5 = 
No ID *) 
 
(*PP chooser*) 
If[lineuptype == 1, 
  If[ev1 > mccsim, makeid1 = 1, makeid1 = -1];          
  If[makeid1 == -1, simresp[[1, 1, 5]] = simresp[[1, 1, 5]] + 1]; 
  If[makeid1 == 1 && Max[imax[[1]]] == 1, simresp[[1, 1, 1]] = simresp[[1, 1, 1]] + 1];  
  If[makeid1 == 1 && Max[imax[[1]]] == 2, simresp[[1, 1, 3]] = simresp[[1, 1, 3]] + 1];  
  If[makeid1 == 1 && Max[imax[[1]]] == 3, simresp[[1, 1, 2]] = simresp[[1, 1, 2]] + 1];  
  If[makeid1 == 1 && Max[imax[[1]]] > 3, simresp[[1, 1, 4]] = simresp[[1, 1, 4]] + 1]; 
]; 
(*TA chooser*) 
If[lineuptype == 1, 
  If[ev2 > mccsim, makeid2 = 1, makeid2 = -1]; 
  If[makeid2 == -1, simresp[[1, 2, 5]] = simresp[[1, 2, 5]] + 1]; 
  If[makeid2 == 1 && Max[imax[[2]]] == 1, simresp[[1, 2, 4]] = simresp[[1, 2, 4]] + 1]; 
  If[makeid2 == 1 && Max[imax[[2]]] == 2, simresp[[1, 2, 3]] = simresp[[1, 2, 3]] + 1]; 
  If[makeid2 == 1 && Max[imax[[2]]] == 3, simresp[[1, 2, 2]] = simresp[[1, 2, 2]] + 1]; 






If[lineuptype == 2, 
  If[ev1 > mnccsim, makeid1 = 1, makeid1 = -1]; 
  If[makeid1 == -1, simresp[[2, 1, 5]] = simresp[[2, 1, 5]] + 1]; 
  If[makeid1 == 1 && Max[imax[[1]]] == 1, simresp[[2, 1, 1]] = simresp[[2, 1, 1]] + 1]; 
  If[makeid1 == 1 && Max[imax[[1]]] == 2, simresp[[2, 1, 3]] = simresp[[2, 1, 3]] + 1]; 




If[lineuptype == 2, 
  If[ev2 > mnccsim, makeid2 = 1, makeid2 = -1]; 
  If[makeid2 == -1, simresp[[2, 2, 5]] = simresp[[2, 2, 5]] + 1]; 
  If[makeid2 == 1 && Max[imax[[2]]] == 1, simresp[[2, 2, 4]] = simresp[[2, 2, 4]] + 1]; 
  If[makeid2 == 1 && Max[imax[[2]]] == 2, simresp[[2, 2, 3]] = simresp[[2, 2, 3]] + 1]; 








(* For a dual core machine *) 
DistributeDefinitions[wme, ncore, nsim, tsim, encode, dgs, cencode, mugencode, 
cmug, smp, sfp, mugsize, mccsim, mnccsim, wa, wr]; 
ParWme = ParallelEvaluate[wme[]];  
Combsimresp = ParWme[[1, 1]] + ParMew[[2, 1]]; 
Combchooser = ParWme[[1, 2]] + ParMew[[2, 2]]; 
 
(*Calculate sum of squared differences*) 
ssd = (Combsimresp[[1, 1, 1]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 1, 1]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[1, 1, 2]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 1, 2]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[1, 1, 3]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 1, 3]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[1, 1, 4]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 1, 4]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[1, 1, 5]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 1, 5]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[2, 1, 1]]/Combchooser[[2]] - simdata[[2, 1, 1]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[2, 1, 3]]/Combchooser[[2]] - simdata[[2, 1, 3]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[2, 1, 4]]/Combchooser[[2]] - simdata[[2, 1, 4]])^2 + 




   (Combsimresp[[1, 2, 2]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 2, 2]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[1, 2, 3]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 1, 3]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[1, 2, 4]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 2, 4]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[1, 2, 5]]/Combchooser[[1]] - simdata[[1, 2, 5]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[2, 2, 3]]/Combchooser[[2]] - simdata[[2, 2, 3]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[2, 2, 4]]/Combchooser[[2]] - simdata[[2, 2, 4]])^2 + 
   (Combsimresp[[2, 2, 5]]/Combchooser[[2]] - simdata[[2, 2, 5]])^2 +  
   (N[Combchooser[[1]]/tsim] - mugchoose)^2; 
 
(*Data for r2*) 
x =  
  {Combsimresp[[1, 1, 1]]/Combchooser[[1]], Combsimresp[[1, 1,]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
   Combsimresp[[1, 1, 3]]/Combchooser[[1]],  Combsimresp[[1, 1, 4]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
   Combsimresp[[1, 1, 5]]/Combchooser[[1]],  Combsimresp[[2, 1, 1]]/Combchooser[[2]],  
   Combsimresp[[2, 1, 3]]/Combchooser[[2]],  Combsimresp[[2, 1, 4]]/Combchooser[[2]],  
   Combsimresp[[2, 1, 5]]/Combchooser[[2]],  Combsimresp[[1, 2, 2]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
   Combsimresp[[1, 2, 3]]/Combchooser[[1]],  Combsimresp[[1, 2, 4]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
   Combsimresp[[1, 2, 5]]/Combchooser[[1]],  Combsimresp[[2, 2, 3]]/Combchooser[[2]],  
   Combsimresp[[2, 2, 4]]/Combchooser[[2]],  Combsimresp[[2, 2, 5]]/Combchooser[[2]], 
   N[Combchooser[[1]]/tsim]}; 
 
y =  
 {simdata[[1, 1, 1]], simdata[[1, 1, 2]], simdata[[1, 1, 3]], simdata[[1, 1, 4]],  
   simdata[[1, 1, 5]], simdata[[2, 1, 1]], simdata[[2, 1, 3]], simdata[[2, 1, 4]],  
   simdata[[2, 1, 5]], simdata[[1, 2, 2]], simdata[[1, 2, 3]], simdata[[1, 2, 4]],  











Print["\n", "MODEL Mugbook Chooser PP "]; 
Print[ 
  " Perpetrator: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 1, 1]]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
  " Committed: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 1, 2]]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
  " Familiar Seen: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 1, 3]]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
  " New Foil: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 1, 4]]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
  " No ID: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 1, 5]]]/Combchooser[[1]]]; 
 
Print["DATA Mugbook Chooser PP "]; 
Print[ 
  " Perpetrator: ", simdata[[1, 1, 1]],  
  " Committed: ", simdata[[1, 1, 2]],  
  " Familiar Seen: ", simdata[[1, 1, 3]],  
  " New Foil: ", simdata[[1, 1, 4]],  
  " No ID: ", simdata[[1, 1, 5]]]; 
 
Print["MODEL Mugbook Non-Chooser PP "]; 
Print[ 
  " Perpetrator: ", N[Combsimresp[[2, 1, 1]]]/Combchooser[[2]],  
  " Familiar Seen: ", N[Combsimresp[[2, 1, 3]]]/Combchooser[[2]], 
  " New Foil: ", N[Combsimresp[[2, 1, 4]]]/Combchooser[[2]],  
  " No ID: ", N[Combsimresp[[2, 1, 5]]]/Combchooser[[2]]]; 
 
Print["DATA Mugbook Non-Chooser PP "]; 
Print[ 
  " Perpetrator: ", simdata[[2, 1, 1]], 
  " Familiar Seen: ", simdata[[2, 1, 3]],  
  " New Foil: ", simdata[[2, 1, 4]],  









(* Perpetrator Absent *) 
 
Print["\n", "MODEL Mugbook Chooser PA "]; 
Print[ 
  " Committed: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 2, 2]]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
  " Familiar Seen: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 2, 3]]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
  " New Foil: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 2, 4]]]/Combchooser[[1]],  
  " No ID: ", N[Combsimresp[[1, 2, 5]]]/Combchooser[[1]]]; 
 
 
Print["DATA Mugbook Chooser TA "]; 
Print[ 
  " Commit: ", simdata[[1, 2, 2]],  
  " Critical Foil: ", simdata[[1, 2, 3]], " New Foil: ", simdata[[1, 2, 4]],  
  " No ID: ", simdata[[1, 2, 5]]]; 
Print["MODEL Mugbook Non-Chooser TA "]; 
Print[ 
  " Familiar Seen: ", N[Combsimresp[[2, 2, 3]]]/Combchooser[[2]],  
  " New Foil: ", N[Combsimresp[[2, 2, 4]]]/Combchooser[[2]],  
  " No ID: ", N[Combsimresp[[2, 2, 5]]]/Combchooser[[2]]]; 
 
Print["DATA Mugbook Non-Chooser TA "]; 
Print[ 
  " Familiar Seen: ", simdata[[2, 2, 3]],  
  " New Foil: ", simdata[[2, 2, 4]],  
  " No ID: ", simdata[[2, 2, 5]]]; 
 
Print["\n", "\n", "RMSD ", Sqrt[ssd/17]]; 
Print["rsquared =", (Correlation[x, y]^2)] ; 
 
